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1 BACKGROUND 
 
 
Air transportation, the most rapidly growing mode of transportation, is also one of the safest modes 
of travel. Nevertheless, the public demands that safety levels continuously improve and that the 
absolute number of aviation accidents continues to decline, even as air traffic levels increase. 
 
NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) was initiated in 2000 to develop the enabling 
technologies that could, if implemented, reduce the aircraft accident rate by a factor of five within 
ten years and by a factor of ten within twenty years. One of the projects within the AvSP, the 
Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project, addresses the need to provide decision 
makers with the tools for safety improvement by identifying and correcting the predisposing 
conditions that could lead to accidents. The objective of the ASMM project is to develop 
technologies that will enable proactive management of safety risk from a system-wide perspective.1
 
A proactive approach to identifying and alleviating life-threatening conditions in the aviation system 
entails a well-defined process of identifying threats, evaluating causes, assessing risks, and 
implementing appropriate solutions. This process is not a trivial undertaking. It requires continuous 
monitoring of system performance in a non-punitive environment; learning from normal operational 
experience; comparing actual performance to expected performance; identifying the precursor events 
and conditions that foreshadow most accidents; designing appropriate interventions to minimize the 
risk of their occurrence; and having a system in place to monitor the efficacy of the interventions. 
 
At each of these stages, airline domain experts, air traffic managers, and other providers of aviation 
services must make key decisions. The ASMM project provides computational tools that focus the 
attention of human experts on the most significant events, and that help them identify the factors that 
distinguish unsafe operations from routine operations. The purpose of the ASMM tools is to convert 
a bounty of raw aviation operational data drawn from many sources—aircraft flight data recorders, 
ATC radar tracks, maintenance logs, weather records, and aviation safety incident reports—into 
insightful interpretations of the health and safety of the National Aviation System (NAS). 
Computational sciences and information technology can be used to cope with the great disparity of 
formats and types of these data sources that include continuous and discrete quantitative data and 
textual data. However, when it comes to making decisions about aviation safety, the best use of 
computer sciences is to help the human gain insight into operations. Even the most advanced 
adaptations of information technologies and computer sciences cannot replace the human expert 
with automated decisions. 
 
Identifying and recognizing precursors of the next accidents pose considerable challenges that are 
being addressed in many domains, including nuclear, medical, chemical, pharmaceutical, and space 
missions, as well as aviation (Phimister 2003). Each domain may have its own definition of a 
precursor, and so it is important for the reader to understand what the authors mean when we use the 
term throughout this report. 
                                                 
1
 We use the term “system” in this report to include all aspects of air transportation including, but not limited to, air 
carrier and general aviation operations, air traffic management, training, maintenance, design, manufacturing, rules 
and regulations, weather, and organizational cultures. 
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We use the term precursor to mean the symptom of a systemic problem that is conducive to human 
error and that, if left unresolved, has the potential to result in an accident. A symptom is a 
measurable deviation from expectations or the norm. It is the problem that must be treated, not the 
symptom. 
 
We need to start with a model to understand the problem. In Section 5, we describe our concept of 
Scenario as follows: 
 
 SCENARIO = {CONTEXT + BEHAVIOR ! OUTCOME} 
 
We consider the Context to be that of the last safe state2, and the Behavior results in the transition to 
the Outcome. When the Outcome is an anomalous (unwanted or compromised) state, the last safe 
state is identified as a precursor. A set of our experiments (the first of which is described in 
Section 8) is directed at exploring the correlations between the categorical features of the Context 
and of the anomalous Outcomes. Our assumption (yet to be proven) is that such correlations, 
together with inputs from domain experts, will help us identify those specific categorical features 
that cause the last safe state to be a precursor. That is, the causal factors of the Behavior produce the 
transition from the last safe state to the unwanted Outcome. Our concept of Scenario constitutes the 
basis for the experiments discussed in Sections 7 and 8, and the future directions of this research 
discussed in Section 9. 
 
The tools developed to date under the ASMM Project for extracting information from data—in 
particular, quantitative data—have been based largely on statistical analyses. However, as discussed 
by Pearl (1997), statistical correlation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for causality. 
Correlations among precursors, anomalous states, and incidents can provide, at best, partial and 
indirect evidence about causal links. For example, when we explore correlation between anomalies 
and contextual factors as described in Section 8, we must be careful that we do not lead the reader to 
believe that these are necessarily causal factors. An example is that incidents associated with 
Traffic-alert and Collision-Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts will be well correlated with an aircraft 
being airborne, but we should not conclude that being airborne is a causal factor of TCAS events. A 
further caution is that we must not come to conclusions based on statistical analyses that may not 
have included significant operational factors (Simpson’s paradox). For example, a comparison of 
operations at two airports may be skewed quite differently if we include weather. Or to cite another 
example, a comparison of operations of two make/model aircraft (say, the Boeing 737 and the 
Airbus 320) may be changed if we included aspects of the flight crews’ training experience. Causes 
cannot be derived on the basis of statistical or functional relationships alone. 
 
It is important that the precursor not be viewed as being synonymous with causality. Recall that we 
have identified the last safe state as a precursor if (and only if), among its categorical features, it 
includes those particular factors that cause the Behavior to produce a transition to an anomalous 
state. It is in this sense, that we use the term “causal factors” to include: 
• Conditions necessary for the occurrence of a precursor 
 
AND 
                                                 
2
 When we speak of the “state” in this report, and, in particular, in Section 5, we mean the state of the entire system. 
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• Conditions that increase the probability of occurrence of that precursor. 
 
Note that the treatment of the causal factors often entails a re-design, a new procedure, and new 
training. 
 
Consequently, in the approach to the study reported here, we are searching for the causal factors of 
the precursor incident and not for the anomalous consequences, per se. Even more precisely, as 
discussed in Section 9, we are seeking to uncover those particular causal factors of the precursor that 
explain why the transition to the anomalous state occurred. 
 
Identifying the precursors of the next accident is a particular challenge in a complex operating 
environment like that of aviation with many interacting components. People are key components of 
the aviation system, and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of 
incidents and accidents. Sixty to eighty percent of fatal aviation accidents are attributed (rightly or 
wrongly) to human error. (See, for example, Boeing 2002 and 2004.) However, simply saying that 
one or more of the humans in a system may have made a mistake is not constructive. 
 
The attribution of “human error” is a social- and psychological-based judgment of human 
performance made in hindsight that is invariably biased by knowledge of the outcome (Woods et al. 
1994). However, human performance is relied upon to resolve uncertainties, conflicts, and 
competing demands inherent in large, complex systems. Consequently, human performance is as 
complex as the domain in which it is exercised and cannot be judged independently. Human 
behavior is context-dependent, and little can be understood of the causes of human error without 
understanding the prevailing as well as the more distal precursor conditions conducive to error. 
Much depends on being able to determine how complex systems have failed and on the human 
contribution to such outcome failures. Consequently, our question is, “Why do professional, well-
trained, highly motivated operators of the aviation system make mistakes?” Our focus is on 
uncovering and understanding those precursor conditions that elevate the probability of downstream 
human errors and that, in turn, may contribute to aviation safety incidents or accidents. Knowledge 
about these systemic features helps us to understand how they shape human behavior and how to 
improve the performance of the system. 
 
The ASMM project has developed automated tools for extracting information from both quantitative 
numeric data, and from qualitative textual data, and for recognizing information from either data 
source that may be relevant to a particular query. Information extracted from quantitative data 
sources helps the domain expert understand the objective aspects of what happened, and from 
qualitative data sources to understand the subjective aspects of why an incident occurred. Each 
ASMM tool contributes insights into the complete picture of an event, and supports the 
complementary processes of causal analysis and safety-risk assessment. Causal analysis and safety-
risk assessment, together with analysis of associated costs and benefits, are all required in order for 
experts to formulate appropriate interventions. 
 
This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data 
sources that primarily aid the expert in understanding why an incident occurred. Throughout this 
report, we will make reference to extracting objective as well as subjective information from textual 
reports. However, our main focus is on understanding why an incident occurred, for which we must 
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rely on the subjective perspective of the reporter of the incident. We rely on other quantitative data 
sources (e.g., in-flight-recorded data and air-traffic-radar data) and other ASMM tools (Chidester 
2001, Chidester 2003, Ferryman 2001, and Statler et al. 2003) to extract the complementary 
information about what happened. 
 
 
2 THE CONTEXT OF THIS STUDY 
 
 
This report explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of accident or 
incident reports, and consistently and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior 
in aviation operations (the why of an incident). Incident reports indicate the presence of problems in 
systems that, if left unresolved, have the potential to result in an accident (Heinrich 1959). The 
experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about why an 
incident happened. 
 
The analysis of textual databases poses several challenges. First, the process is typically labor-
intensive and requires high-priced domain expertise. Further, such analyses not only require experts 
from aviation operations to understand what happened according to the reported incident, but they 
will often also require experts in human factors to explain why events happened. Unfortunately, 
current methods for analyzing textual data often focus on what went wrong and what the 
consequences were, but fail to exploit this primary source of information about why an event 
happened. Therefore, there is a need for new analytical methods and automated capabilities to help 
the experts mine these rich and complex textual databases for insight into the causal, contributing, 
and aggravating factors of an event. 
 
There are two primary sources of aviation experiential, textual reports to which reference will be 
made throughout this report. One of these is the database of the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS), (Reynard et al. 1986, Chappell 1997, and Connell 1999), which is a collection of nearly 
115,000 narratives of aviation safety incidents that have been voluntarily submitted by reporters 
from across the aviation industry. The ASRS, managed by NASA and funded by the FAA Office of 
System Safety since 1976, is one of the world's best-known and most highly regarded repositories of 
safety information. ASRS incident reports have been used extensively for this study, as well as for 
earlier studies, as a unique “test bed” for evaluating the tools that are being developed under the 
ASMM Project for processing and analyzing textual data. In addition, this study has benefited from 
convenient access to knowledgeable ASRS personnel who have developed, operated, and utilized 
the system to the benefit of the industry. 
 
The Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) are currently generating the other database of textual 
incident reports on which ASMM tools and methodologies are being tested. The ASAP programs are 
intramural, voluntary safety reporting programs through which certificated personnel (pilots, 
dispatchers, mechanics) at participating air carriers report any safety concern they observe, even if it 
resulted from their own errors. Modeled on concepts and principles first put into place under the 
ASRS, ASAP reporting and processing are non-punitive and confidential. Under a collaborative 
agreement with one air carrier, some of the tools and methodologies described in this report are 
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being tested on ASAP reports, but this report will address only the experiments that used ASRS 
incident reports. 
 
This report describes a data model and related experiments aimed at achieving an automated 
understanding of the causal factors of the human error embodied in reported incidents. Our approach 
is not designed to fit any specific incident-reporting system—our methodology must be sufficiently 
generic to be used with any database of textual reports of aviation incidents—but we are going to 
refer often to the ASRS because it is representative of all such databases.  
 
There are, of course, many tools already available for searching textual databases. We have 
considered their applicability to our needs and, in Appendix A, we describe several tools that we 
tested on subsets of ASRS reports prior to undertaking this study. Others are continually being 
identified and evaluated in this ongoing study. 
 
2.1 Research Objectives 
 
The intent of this research is to better understand the quantitative and qualitative attributes of an 
aviation incident, and to identify the respective contributions of their interaction to incident 
occurrence. The focus of our research is on the contextual aspects of this interaction. Our specific 
research questions are as follows: 
1. What is the fundamental structure underlying an aviation incident? What are the contextual 
parameters associated with each part of this structure? Which of these parameters can be 
considered objective (based on observable data), and which subjective (existing largely within 
the reporter’s mind)? Can the parameters used to define the structure of an incident be adapted to 
an automated clustering process? 
2. What are the pragmatic constraints we must consider in undertaking experiments in automated 
clustering that are based on statistical analysis and that can be used on very large databases of 
textual reports? Can the similarities highlighted by an automated clustering process be checked 
for validity and usefulness? How can we use domain knowledge to minimize the domain size 
that the automated tools must consider? 
3. Is there a conceptual paradigm that will allow us to explain the sequential, discriminating factors 
that constitute the why and how of incidents in large aviation databases like the ASRS database? 
Can this description be used to “tune” automated analyses that will identify contextual 
similarities between groups of incidents? 
 
2.2 Outline of This Research Report 
 
Incident reports are written by operational personnel who try to describe as clearly as they can a 
situation they encountered having safety implications. The report forms used by the ASRS and the 
ASAP contain both fixed fields and free narratives. Together they present the story of what 
happened, how it happened, and, often, some attempt to explain why. 
 
Automated tools for aiding analyses of textual databases must enable efficient retrospective search 
for any prescribed event, and must also enable discovery of the un-envisioned. One of the biggest 
challenges of proactive management of risks is to develop the capability to explore data without 
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knowing what we are looking for. The automated tool should be able to extract typical incidents, but 
it should also be able to highlight atypical ones and describe their differences in a way that is similar 
to the tools we have developed for analyzing flight-recorded quantitative data (Ferryman 2001). 
Fundamentally, both of these requirements rely on a capability to extract groups of similar incident 
reports from a very large database. 
 
In the development of tools for analyzing flight-recorded data, we found that a concept we called the 
“flight signature” was useful in guiding the automated identifications of similarities among flights. 
We believed that we needed a similar model to capture the underlying structure of an incident report 
and to guide the automated analyses of textual data. Our many years of experience reading almost 
600,000 ASRS reports3 led us to developing a model based on a sequence of states and transitions. 
In Section 3, we will describe the resulting incident model to aid in understanding the structure of 
incidents. 
 
As stated previously, the incident-report forms have fixed fields that the reporter is expected to 
complete as well as the narrative in a free-text field. The fixed fields (i.e., the attributes), together 
with the information the reporter and the ASRS analyst enter into those fields (i.e., the values of the 
attributes), comprise the codification of the incident report. A coordinated exploitation of the 
information extracted from both the fixed fields and the free-text fields is necessary to achieve our 
objectives, and this is discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
Section 5 introduces the concept of a scenario, a simplified subset of the incident model, as a 
pragmatic approach for guiding automated clustering of similar incidents. 
 
Section 6 presents a summary of the results of the studies described in the previous sections to lay 
the groundwork for the discussions and experiments in the following sections. 
 
Section 7 describes a limited experiment based on 40 incident reports. The aim was to evaluate what 
could be expected from a clustering process based only on the taxonomy (i.e., attributes and values) 
of the fixed fields and the concept of scenario. 
 
Section 8 describes a preliminary experiment to evaluate the capability to identify and cluster 
reliably on similarities of what happened. 
 
Section 9 describes the approach to extract information about why the event occurred, after 
automatically identifying what occurred, using the scenario model. Our approach is based on the 
proposal that loss of situation awareness is the behavioral failure primarily responsible for errors in 
our aviation world. 
 
Section 10 presents a summary of the conclusions of this study and projections of the continuing 
studies. 
 
                                                 
3
 Although the ASRS has received about 600,000 reports in its 28 years of operation, as indicated previously, only about 
115,000 of these have been entered into the database. This has been the result of many factors including judgments on 
significance and multiple reports on the same incident, but, mostly, limitations of available funding. 
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3 THE INCIDENT MODEL 
 
 
The management and the exploitation of very large databases of incident reports highlight the need 
for sophisticated tools to process free text and to automatically classify reports in a way that is 
meaningful to experts. In order to extract useful information (whether quantitative or textual) from 
large databases, it is necessary to identify global patterns and relationships to aid decision-making. 
We need a model with which to guide the automated analyses. 
 
Report narratives embody naturally occurring chains of events and the transitions between events. 
An incident report is similar to a script of a play: it describes the environment of the action, the 
protagonists, and the steps (or acts) in the course of the story. In fact, we will introduce the concept 
of a “scenario” of a report to represent these naturally occurring “stories.” The aim of the next 
section is to define more precisely the elements of this model, in order to highlight concepts that 
could be used to calibrate automated tools that will extract information about why the incident 
occurred. We will first define the meanings of the words used in our model. 
 
3.1 Definitions 
 
World: “An area, sphere or realm (a field of interest or study) considered as a complete 
environment” (Collins Dictionary) 
 
The world of an ASRS-like incident report is composed of all the aircraft, people, weather elements, 
ground equipment, and other factors that have to be taken into account to describe and understand 
the course of events that happen (the story). The world of the aviation incident report is a subset of 
the real world. The boundary of this world (i.e., defining what is needed for a complete environment) 
is always subjective and depends on the granularity of the description and the scope of the 
understanding that we want to reach. Following are two examples of what we mean by a bounded 
world of an incident report:  
1. A report describes an incident that took place in San Francisco in severe weather conditions. The 
cause of such weather conditions is the El Niño phenomenon. Nevertheless, El Niño will not be 
part of the world of this incident, as the aim is not to understand the weather conditions, but the 
incident that occurred. 
2. A report is about an incident in which an air-traffic controller made an inappropriate decision 
that resulted in a loss of desired separation between two aircraft. Which aircraft have to be taken 
into account in the world of this incident? Only the ones in conflict? All the aircraft under the 
control of the controller (because they change the task of the controller)? We will consider only 
the aircraft in conflict, as all of the aircraft under the controller’s direction are outside the bounds 
of our “story.” 
 
The world is changing continuously; therefore, its description has to be dynamic. 
 
Parameters: The world and its evolution are observed and described through parameters. Some 
parameters are linked to physical measures; others are not. Parameters can be objective (i.e., defined 
on bases of observable data) as, for instance, flight altitude, or subjective (i.e., the value of the 
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parameter is not a result of observable data) as, for instance, the ASRS report-form entry “passenger 
misconduct” to describe a world in which a passenger exhibits abnormal behavior. 
 
The choice of parameters adopted to describe the world is crucial, as this choice largely determines 
which sort of automatic treatment will be possible. Two criteria have to be considered in the 
selection of parameters: the level of abstraction of the concept embodied by the parameter, and the 
ability of this parameter to represent “small” variations. 
 
For instance, let us consider a very simple world that consists only of an electric light bulb. We can 
choose to describe this world using the terminal voltage of this bulb, or with a Boolean parameter 
(i.e., on/off). The levels of abstraction of these two factors are not the same, and their abilities to 
describe the evolution of the world for short periods of time are not the same. If we want to have 
only a “high level” understanding of the evolution of the world (as a pilot might), the Boolean 
parameter is the better choice. If we want to understand the response of the component to specific 
electrical signals, the voltage is a better-adapted parameter. 
 
 
Time
Volts
OFF
ON
Boolean Parameter
Voltage Level
T0 T1
 
Figure 1. Example of parameter. 
 
State (of the world): The state of the world is the description of the world at a fixed time (a 
snapshot). The state of the world is given by the values of all the parameters that have been chosen 
to describe that world. For instance, the state of the “bulb” world at time T0 is “Off” if we describe 
this world with the Boolean parameter. 
 
Event: “Anything that takes place, especially something important” (Collins Dictionary) 
 
When we observe the evolution of the world over a period of time, the evolution of some of its 
parameters can be described by an abstract concept called an event. An event is defined by a 
progressive evolution of a set of parameters that “makes sense.” For instance, the evolution of the 
Boolean parameter between T0 and T1 is typical and allows us to define the event: “switch on.” 
 
As an event describes the evolution of some subset of all of the parameters that describe the world, it 
gives information about the state of the world before the event, during the event, and after the event. 
 
The level of abstraction of the events defined can be a simple evolution of a few parameters (for 
instance, our event “switch on”), or a very complex combination of parameters (for instance, an 
aircraft “takeoff”). Some events, such as “takeoff,” can be decomposed into more elementary events 
(such as “accelerate,” “rotate,” “liftoff,” etc.), called sub-events. 
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Transition: “Change or passage from one state or stage to another” (Collins Dictionary) 
 
A transition is a combination of events that allows the world to change from one state to another. 
 
Incident: Aeronautical operations are planned according to some rules. These rules try to keep the 
world in “safe” states and provide criteria to define “unsafe” states (for instance, two commercial 
aircraft in flight separated by only 100 feet define an “unsafe” state of the world). When the 
evolution of the world brings it to some “unsafe” state, we have an incident. 
 
An incident is an evolution of the world such that the state of the world reaches some “unsafe” state, 
and then returns to a safe state. 
 
3.2 The State/Transition Representation of the Incident Model 
 
Reporters of aeronautical incidents describe problems encountered during flight operations. They 
usually tell them as stories and concentrate on what happened, on the involvement and behavior of 
people as well as on the important features that help us to understand why these problems occurred. 
Hence, we assume that the course of an incident is well described by a sequence of states and 
transitions, and that the whole incident can be decomposed into a sequence of transitions leading the 
world to evolve from one state to another. Our first assumption is that the essence of the evolution of 
our world can be captured adequately from the report of the incident, and that this model can be used 
to tune clustering tools. 
 
Therefore, all the information contained in the report can be associated with a description of a state 
of the world, or with the characterization of an event that contributes to a transition. 
 
Example: (ACN 81075) “WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH BEHIND A WDB FOR 
RWY 28R. AT ABOUT 1000' AGL THE TWR OFFERED US 28L. WE CHANGED 
TO 28L AND THE TWR CLRD THE WDB TO CROSS 28L AHEAD OF US. THE 
WDB DELAYED XING AND WHEN WE WERE CLOSE IN THE TWR OFFERED 
US 28R. WE ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE TO 28R BUT WERE TOO CLOSE IN TO 
MANEUVER AND SO WE WENT AROUND.”4
 
In this example, the first sentence describes a state of the world, while the phrase, “We changed to 
28L,” describes an event that belongs to the first transition. The evolution of the world as described 
in this narrative can be represented by a sequence of 4 states, as shown in figure 2. 
 
                                                 
4
 For the reader who may not be familiar with aviation abbreviations, following is a literal translation: “We were on a 
visual approach behind a wide-body for runway 28 Right. At about 1000 feet above ground level, the tower offered us 
28 Left. We changed to 28 Left and the tower cleared the wide-body to cross 28 Left ahead of us. The wide-body 
delayed crossing and when we were close in the tower offered us 28 Right. We attempted to change to 28 Right but 
were too close in to maneuver and so we went around.” 
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Aircraft A 
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Apch 28R 
 
A 
WDB 
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Aircraft A 
Apch 28L 
WDB 28R 
 
Transition 
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28L to A 
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28L 
Transition
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Aircraft A 
Apch 28L 
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A
WDB 
Transition 
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28R to A 
Attempt to 
change 
Went around 
State 4 
Aircraft A went 
around 
WDB taxiing 
 
A
WDB 
Time 
A 
WDB 
Figure 2. A state/transition decomposition of an incident report. 
 
Nearly all stories (whether in the aviation world or not) can be decomposed into a State/Transition 
sequence. However, aviation incident reports have other characteristics that we need to exploit. The 
notion of an aviation incident implies an issue of safety: operational personnel consider that an 
incident occurs if, for a period of time, the situation is considered as “unsafe” or anomalous. Such 
notions are not clearly defined and not always interpreted in the same way by all operational 
personnel. Nevertheless, we can assume that, at a given point in time, aircraft are expected to exhibit 
a set of Required Properties that define the aircraft (viewed as a total system) as being in a nominally 
safe state. The Required Properties relate to the aircraft’s 
• position (altitude, latitude, longitude, airspace occupancy) 
• trajectory (heading and projected course) 
• flight dynamics (attitude, rotation rates, and speed) 
• airframe integrity 
• propulsion status 
• compliance with clearances, regulations, and SOPs. 
 
This definition implies that there is an expected reference value for each of these properties at every 
point in time. On the basis of these Required Properties, we can define the following three states of 
our aviation world: 
 
SAFE: All the aircraft and people (crews, traffic controllers…) and all the key systems (aircraft 
systems, ILS…) are in a state that approximates normalcy. 
 
COMPROMISED: A person involved in the situation or an aircraft system is in an undesirable 
state, or undesirable environmental factors impinge upon the aircraft, but for all the involved 
aircraft their Required Properties are still nominal and the separation between aircraft complies 
with norms. 
 
ANOMALOUS: One or more of the Required Properties of an aircraft or an involved person is 
observably not in compliance with pertinent norms. 
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We can now characterize what we call an aviation incident as follows: 
 
INCIDENT: An incident is a finite sequence of states and transitions such that: 
• the first state is safe, 
• the last state is safe, 
• all the other states are either compromised or anomalous, and 
• at least one state is anomalous. 
 
If the state does not return to a safe one, the story is not related to an incident, but to an accident. If 
no anomalous state is reached, the story is not considered to be an incident. (Figure 3 shows this 
description of our incident model.) As shown in figure 3, the last unsafe state is often an anomalous 
one, but this constraint is not required by our definition. 
 
 
Time 
. . . . . .
State 1 State 2 State n-1 State n 
Transition 1 Transition 2 Transition n-2 Transition n-1 
SAFE state SAFE state COMPROMISED  or  ANOMALOUS states
 
Figure 3. The incident model. 
 
The aim of our incident model is to identify the key components that can be used to tune automated 
data-mining tools. We are proposing that this representation (i.e., the Incident Model), with its 
complete descriptions of all of the states and transitions during the evolution of an incident, is a 
generic model of any and all experiential reports of incidents that occur in our world of aviation. The 
descriptions of the states and transitions are based on parameters. Therefore, we will need to study 
the set of possible parameters, and we will discuss this in the next section. 
 
 
4 PARAMETERS FOR THE DESCRIPTION OF STATES AND 
TRANSITIONS 
 
 
We said in Section 3.1 that the world and its evolution are observed and described through 
parameters. In the example presented in figure 2, states and events have been described in an 
informal way by sentences or words extracted from the narrative. Choosing a set of parameters that 
describe a state of the world and a set of parameters that describe a transition will give us a more 
formal description of each part of such an incident. 
11 
A wide variety of taxonomic structures5 is used in the different accident/incident databases.6 Our 
first objective was to identify the taxonomy, together with all of its possible terms and their 
structure, which is most suitable for reports of incidents in our world of aviation. Each term must 
map to a parameter in the description of our world in the incident model. The set of parameters that 
we selected for our study is based on three taxonomic structures underlying three codification forms 
designed specifically for use with the ASRS database. 
• The ASRS codification: The codification of an ASRS incident report is comprised of the set 
of attributes (the fixed fields) and the values of those attributes (entered by the reporter). This 
structured set of ‘descriptors’ is currently used to describe the incident and store it in the 
database. The codification form is designed for use by operational personnel. One part of the 
ASRS report form focuses on the involvement and behavior of the protagonists in the “story” 
reported. In fact, the ASRS report form (NASA ARC 227B – January 1994) encourages 
reporters to describe the “Chain of Events” (i.e., how the problem arose – contributing 
factors – how it was discovered – corrective actions) as well as “Human Performance 
Considerations” (i.e., perception, judgment, decisions; actions or inactions; factors affecting 
the quality of human performance). Nearly 115,000 incident reports have been codified with 
this taxonomic structure and are available for further evaluation in the ASRS database. 
• The X-Form is another template that was designed to update the codification of ASRS 
reports. It was designed by ASRS personnel after several years of experience entering the 
reports into the database and conducting retrospective searches. It contains more fields 
(attributes) than the ASRS codification, which were intended to improve the descriptions of 
human-factors issues, but it has never been implemented for routine operational use by the 
ASRS. 
• The Cinq-Demi methodology was developed during the 1980s as a tool for analyzing 
aeronautical-incident reports from a human-factor’s point of view. (A brief description of 
this methodology is provided in Appendix B.) This methodology involves a structured 
analysis that focuses on identifying conditions having a high probability of leading to human 
errors. A codification form for ASRS reports was designed from the perspective of this 
methodology. Small sub-sets of ASRS reports have been codified using this methodology 
and are available for further evaluation. 
 
Appendix C contains a description of the study that was made of these three codification schemes. 
The comparison of their structures and a mapping of all of the parameters used in the three forms 
were the bases of the following discussion and the definition of the full set of parameters that is 
provided in Appendix D. 
 
                                                 
5
 By taxonomic structure, we mean a structured set of terms that describe some domain or topic. The taxonomic 
structure provides a skeletal structure for a knowledge base. 
6
 As examples, O’Leary et al. (2002) gives examples of the type of parameters used in the British Airways Safety 
Information System (BASIS) while Murayama et al. (2002) shows some of the Performance Shaping Factors used in a 
marine incident reporting system. 
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4.1 High-Level Structure of the Three Codifications 
 
As explained in Appendix C, the structures of the three codification forms for ASRS reports differ in 
specificities, but their global organizations are quite similar. The information contained in all three 
can be classified into the following five categories:  
1. Time and Setting: We group in this category all the information related to the framework of the 
story (when, where…) and to the fixed entities (facilities…).  
2. Cast of entities: This category contains information on the persons and all the entities that 
evolve and take actions in order to create the story. 
3. Anomaly: This category pertains to all the information that explains why the “anomalous state” 
is anomalous. 
4. Transitions: This category is all the information that characterizes a transition in the incident 
model of states and transitions. 
5. Other: This category includes any information that cannot be classified into any of the other 
four categories. 
 
These categories are used only for the codification of a report and not for an in-depth analysis of the 
incident. They include neither a precise description of the sequence of transitions, nor an accurate 
time reference. The value of a well-designed codification is, primarily, in its ability to effect an 
efficient retrospective search of the database so as to produce a minimum of false positives. 
Nevertheless, worthwhile analyses can be conducted based solely on the information contained in 
the fixed fields of the form. Figure 4 consolidates the information contained in the three codification 
forms and shows the overall structure of knowledge of an incident report.  
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Figure 4. Consolidated structure of ASRS codifications. 
 
4.2 A Full and Complete Set of Parameters 
 
As highlighted in Wiegmann and Thaden (2003), most reports are highly informative about what 
happened, but give much less definitive information about why an incident happened. Consequently, 
there is merit to designing the clustering process so that the first level of automated filtering clusters 
incident reports on the basis of similarities in what happened. Furthermore, most of the information 
about what happened is contained in the parameters (attributes and values of the fixed fields) of the 
consolidated structure of ASRS codification (see the previous section and Appendix C). 
Consequently, our first objective was to come to agreement on the “full and complete” set of 
parameters that describe our world. Appendix D discusses the mapping of the parameters of the 
three codification forms; we assume that merging these parameters results in a nearly “full and 
complete” set of parameters that describe our world. Also, for every parameter used, we can state if 
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the concept captured is objective or not. We use the following definition: a concept is objective if its 
definition can be based on observable data. All the concepts that are not objective are called 
subjective.7
 
Our hypothesis is that a full and complete set of objective parameters of an incident in “our” world 
adequately describes what happened. We further assume that, given a full and complete set of the 
objective parameters, automated tools could reliably cluster incident reports on the basis of what 
happened and could, thereby, provide an adequate description of what happened. (The experiments 
to demonstrate this are discussed later in this report.) In fact, clustering on the what may prove to be 
pragmatically sufficient for an effective retrospective search for similar incidents, even though the 
explanation of why may be quite different for the clusters of incidents. The understanding of why the 
incident happened will rely on subjective parameters and exploitation of the free text. The proposed 
process to achieve this in a second stage of automated filtering is discussed later in Section 9 of this 
report. However, first we need to introduce the notion of a scenario and explain how it is used to 
determine similarity of reports, based on what happened. 
 
 
5 THE SCENARIO 
 
 
We use the term “scenario” in the same sense as it is often used in literature or cinematography. We 
will show how it can be used to define a clustering methodology. 
 
Scenario: “A summary of the plot and characters of a play or film” (Collins Dictionary) 
 
Let us begin with an example from literature: “Romeo and Juliet.” The scenario of this play could 
be: “Two young people love each other, but sociological difficulties (hate between the respective 
families) thwart their love. They are desperate when they realize the conflict between their families 
is insoluble, and their despair brings them to their deaths.” A scenario provides a global 
understanding of a story and often emphasizes the starting and ending points of the story. Several 
scenarios, more or less detailed, can be given for the same story, and some different stories (e.g., not 
in the same place, not with the same people…) can have the same scenario. 
 
An aviation incident report can be seen as a story and, as with a play or a movie, we can try to 
extract from it a scenario. An aviation incident report is the story of the evolution of our world from 
a safe state, through a sequence of events and states to a compromised or an anomalous state. If we 
return to our example (ACN 81075) in Section 3.2, its scenario could be: “A transport category 
aircraft is on a visual approach to an airport with active parallel runways. ATC changes the 
aircraft’s landing clearance at low altitude and a conflict develops with a taxiing aircraft. The 
aircraft makes a go-around maneuver.” 
 
The scenario notion can be useful to guiding the extraction of clusters from large databases. Indeed, 
when the search is not related to a pre-defined specific issue or a pre-selected example report, a 
                                                 
7
 Some of the objective factors may come from the fixed fields of a new codification form while others may have to be 
extracted from the narrative, but that is not important to this discussion. 
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meaningful way to build clusters is to group reports with similar scenarios. Identifying the main 
scenarios in a database should help experts identify major safety issues and obtain clues for 
designing intervention strategies. 
 
Therefore, we need to have a more accurate definition of the scenario notion. As with a play, the 
scenario highlights some parts of the story. So the specificities of the story have to be used to define 
the scenario concept. As shown by the state/transition model of an incident, an incident report has a 
specific structure that has to relate to the design of the scenario. Let us recall some of the 
characteristics of an incident: 
• It starts with a safe state, 
• The first transition leads the world into a compromised (or anomalous) state, 
• One of the transitions leads the world into an anomalous state, 
• One subsequent transition recovers a safe state. 
 
Minutes, Seconds ago
Anomalous State
Hours, Minutes ago
Compromised State
Years, Weeks, 
Months, Hours ago 
Safe State
Transitions  
NOW
SAFE
Latent and distal 
events and factors
The Context
Proximal events and factors
Behaviors and actions
 
Figure 5. The framework of the scenario concept. 
 
Figure 5 is another representation of an aviation incident that is obviously similar to figure 4. 
However, we use this representation to make several important points. The initial safe state may 
extend over a long period of time and may entail latent and distal events and factors, such as 
organizational culture, laws and regulations, company policies, and education and training, that may 
influence the behavior of the protagonists. In the time frame of minutes to hours, there may be 
proximal events or factors such as weather, visibility, traffic, fatigue, and equipment that may 
influence the protagonists’ behavior and the transitions from the safe to a compromised state. In the 
time frame of seconds to minutes, the safety of the system may rely upon immediate factors of 
16 
communications between the pilot and the air-traffic controller. The point is that human behavior is 
context-dependent. As we seek to understand the causal factors of human error and the why of the 
incident, that context extends across all three states (safe, compromised, anomalous). Further, the 
factors of the context may evolve during the course of the incident and may even be influenced by 
the actions taken (Woods et al. 1994). 
 
Figures 4 and 5 may well be the representations needed to achieve our objectives. However, they are 
much too complex to be used as a basis for identifying similarities with automated clustering tools, 
at least for this initial study. Therefore, based on our experience with ASRS reports, we chose to 
emphasize three parts of the generic incident model represented in figure 4 for our concept of 
scenario: the first (safe) state (the beginning of the story); the sequence of states and transitions that 
lead the world to the anomalous state; and the anomalous state. Thus, the high-level definition of the 
scenario that has been adopted for this study is:  
 
 SCENARIO = {CONTEXT + BEHAVIOR ! OUTCOME} 
 
With this simplified definition of scenario: 
• The Context fits the exact description of the situation in the last safe state. 
• The Behavior contains all the problematic events that occur during the transition from the 
last safe state to the anomalous state. 
• The Outcome describes why the anomalous state is considered as anomalous. It does not 
necessarily contain all the parameters used to describe the state. 
 
This simplified model may not apply to all worlds and, even for our aviation world, other 
representations could be stated and will, perhaps, have to be explored in future work. As an example, 
we could highlight the recovery action and the final safe state in order to study which parameters 
influenced the recovery process (and so prevented an accident). Also, this model does not provide 
for the possible changes in context across the three states, as the context of the last safe state is 
assumed to prevail throughout the incident. Nevertheless, there is merit in starting with the simplest 
possible model. 
 
The objectives of the first stage of automated analysis are: (1) to identify and describe the scenario 
of an incident report, and (2) to identify similar scenarios from a large database of incident reports. 
Both of these objectives benefit from our simplified definition of scenario. 
 
Figure 6 shows the associations between our definition of scenario and the incident model. Figure 7 
shows its relationship to the high-level structure and informational categories discussed in Section 4. 
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Figure 6. The relation of scenario to the incident model. 
 
We need to focus and guide the automated analyses of textual reports in order to maximize the 
chances of success with current capabilities. One way is to use domain knowledge to minimize the 
extent of the world that the automated tools must consider for each incident report, by aggregating 
the reports in the database. Accordingly, we use “phases of flight” as an aggregating principle 
because aviation-incident scenarios are likely to be identifiable with phases of flight. We may 
choose to further constrain the domain by aggregating reports by size or type of aircraft, for 
example, or by visual versus instrument flight rules, but such aggregations may well be determined 
by the purpose of the search. Next, we again use domain knowledge to identify the possible 
anomalous or compromised states for each phase of flight and, possibly, for each aircraft type. (For 
example, a near-midair collision is not an anomalous state for the taxi-out phase of flight.) Then we 
identify the subset of the “full and complete” set of parameters (objective and subjective) that could 
be relevant to, and that could define the states of, any incident in each of these phases of flight. 
 
The specificity of the parameters used to define the scenario’s three parts will determine the degree 
of discrimination that the automated clustering process can achieve: the parameters used to define 
the Context, Behavior, and Outcome will have to be more detailed and precise if we are interested in 
distinguishing small differences among incidents than if we are only looking for general categories. 
Consequently, the scenario is defined by the subsets of parameters that describe the Context, the 
Behavior, and the Outcome of the incident model that are specific to the “story” of a particular 
incident report. Thus, not all the parameters used to define a state of the world will be used to define 
the Context, because not all the parameters of the Context of the initial safe state are important to, or 
are causal factors of, the Behavior or the Outcome of that “story”. In the same sense, the Outcome is 
described only by those parameters that distinguish this state as an anomalous one. 
 
Therefore, now we have the beginning of a taxonomic structure for the first stage of clustering on 
what happened. We start with a prescribed subset of incident reports (aggregated, for example, by 
the phase of flight and by aircraft type), then identify with this subset all of the possible anomalous 
states, together with the objective descriptors that could possibly be associated with that subset of 
Outcomes. So, within each aggregation by, for example, phase of flight and aircraft type, we focus 
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on the subset of reports related to each of the identified anomalous outcomes. Finally, we identify all 
of the other objective and subjective factors that could be relevant to any incident in that sub-subset. 
This process is intended to minimize the domain that the automated system must consider in this 
first stage of filtering, and to maximize the information known about the incident. In this first stage 
of filtering, we have clustered on similarities of the objective parameters that define the Context of 
the Scenario, together with the similarities of the objective parameters that define each possible 
anomalous state associated with the Outcome of the Scenario in the aggregated subset of reports. 
(The experiment described in Section 8 was designed to explore the potential of this first filtering 
stage on the correlation between the parameters of the Context and each anomalous state.) It is 
desirable to complete this process before we attempt the next stage of automated analysis of the free 
text for its implicit (subjective) information about the clusters identified. 
 
An assumption previously stated is that we have adequately defined what happened (and, possibly, a 
bit of the “how”) by identifying all of the objective parameters of the Context and the Outcome that 
existed in a particular scenario. That was the primary motivation for generating the complete list of 
the objective parameters. However, all of this, so far, is preliminary to our objective of automatically 
defining the why. In the second stage of filtering, we will see if we can isolate the subset of objective 
parameters of the Context that correlate to Behavior in that Scenario and hence to the causal factors 
of the Outcome. This process is described in Section 9. 
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Figure 7. Relations between the scenario and the categories of descriptors. 
 
 
6 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
We have shown how we defined a generic structure of information (a taxonomic model) that is 
adaptable to the description of ASRS-like aviation incident reports. The resulting model of an 
aviation incident is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities among incidents reports. 
The notion of Scenario has been introduced as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities based 
on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. 
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We have assumed that it is possible to design a clustering process guided by the structure of the 
scenario, and that the results will be easier to understand by an aviation expert. We now have the 
simplified structure of the Scenario. We have identified the “full and complete” set of parameters 
that define the Context of the initial safe state, and the anomalous Outcome that adequately describes 
what happened. Automated tools will use the values of these parameters to identify the Scenario and 
to cluster similar Scenarios from the ASRS database. The potential of this approach is demonstrated 
in the experiments that are described in Sections 7 and 8. 
 
 
7 A CASE STUDY 
 
 
All of the work reported in Sections 3 through 6 was preparatory to implementing an approach to 
automated clustering that is based on statistical analysis and that can be used on very large databases 
of textual reports. In this section, we describe an experiment with a different clustering technique 
that can be used only on small sets of reports, but that enables us to evaluate the model we have 
proposed. The clustering tool is described in Section 7.1. It entails a methodology based on Formal 
Concept Analysis (Ganter and Wille 1999) in which it is possible to maintain throughout the 
clustering process an explicit description of the similarities among the parameters of the reports. 
This capability will be used to check whether the similarities highlighted by the clustering process 
are valid and useful. However, there are pragmatic computational limitations to such qualitative 
analyses, so that only small sets of data (reports times parameters) can be considered. The 
statistically based tools will be used to study larger sets of reports, but they may hide the meanings 
of the similarities in a given cluster. As we want first to evaluate the validity of the model, we chose 
to start with a limited experiment based on an explicit handling of similarities. 
 
As explained previously, we assume that a “full and complete” set of objective parameters 
adequately describe what happened. In this study, we are going to extract from the set of objective 
parameters identified previously and in Appendix D, a description of the what of the incident in two 
parts; namely, the “Context” and the “Outcome” of the Scenario as defined in Section 5. Then a set 
of 40 ASRS reports will be codified in a formal language adapted to the clustering tool chosen (in 
Section 7.2). We use a two-step clustering process. First, we identify the Outcomes (in Section 
7.3.1), and then we analyze the Contexts that are typically associated with each of the Outcomes (in 
Section 7.3.2). In Section 7.4, we describe a limited study on the why that relied upon the Cinq-Demi 
codification. 
 
Before we present our study of these 40 reports and the results, we will describe how these particular 
reports were selected from the ASRS database, as well as the clustering tool that we used in the 
study. 
 
7.1 The Sample and The Clustering Tool 
 
Describing objects by their set of properties is a natural process used in several domains. A 
“concept” of the domain can be described by a set of objects: the extent, which is a collection of 
examples of elements that belong to the concept; and the intent, which is the set of their shared 
properties. For instance, the concept of airplane could be captured by a set of objects such as (B737, 
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B747, B777, A320…) and the set of their common properties (wings, tail, engines, pilot…). Given a 
set of objects and the set of properties associated with each object, one can automatically extract all 
the concepts involved. This is the aim of Formal Concept Analysis (Ganter and Wille 1999) based 
on well defined mathematical foundations. An extension of the FCA formalism called Generalized 
Formal concept Analysis (GFA) that enables objects to be described by a structured set of properties 
has been proposed by Chaudron and Maille (Chaudron and Maille 2000), and a tool named Kontex 
has been developed to identify concepts. Given a set of objects and their properties, the Kontex tool 
calculates all the possible concepts, shows all the relations between the concepts (generalization, 
specialization) and describes their similarities and differences by using an adapted graphical 
interface. That tool is well suited to our experiment as each incident report is directly characterized 
by a structured set of properties (as described by the taxonomy) and so can be considered as an 
object of the GFA methodology. The GFA methodology was chosen to conduct the analysis of a 
sub-set of ASRS reports. 
 
An important step in this experiment was selection of the set of reports to analyze. As the purpose 
was to use the explicit description of the similarities and differences between clusters developed 
with the Kontex tool, the number of reports had to be limited both as a matter of practicality in 
reference to calculation complexity, and for ease in interpreting the results. Based on a previous 
study (Maille 2002), a set of 40 ASRS reports seemed to be a practical number. Moreover, as we 
wanted to evaluate whether the taxonomy and the Scenario components supported a meaningful 
clustering on what happened, we wanted to have in the set of reports a small number of different 
Contexts and Outcomes in order to have significant clusters. Indeed, if only 40 reports are taken 
randomly from the database, they will certainly deal with a large variety of different kinds of what 
and it will be difficult to utilize the capabilities of the methodology. Therefore, we decided to focus 
on reports from the particular experiment that was concerned with “In-close Approach Changes 
(ICAC)” (Lecomte et al., informal communication)*. All of these reports deal with aircraft in the 
approach flight phase, and so the number of possible anomalies (or Outcomes) is limited. The 
clustering process would try to reveal finer similarities between groups of reports and possible links 
between Outcomes (or anomalies) and Contexts. In the ICAC experiment, around 200 ASRS reports 
had been codified by the Cinq-Demi team and 100 reports had been fully analyzed using the Cinq-
Demi methodology of Appendix B. We chose for this experiment the first 40 reports in the Cinq-
Demi database that had received a full analysis. 
 
7.2 Formal Codification of the 40 Reports 
 
For the 40 reports, we had both the ASRS and the Cinq-Demi codification available, but not the 
codification with the complete set of parameters described in Appendix D. We decided to rely on the 
ASRS codification as much as possible (flight phase, anomaly…), even if the codification is not 
exactly the one defined in our taxonomy. Then we added to this codification some parameters to 
describe the traffic, the airport (configuration of the active runways…) because these important 
parameters are not addressed in the ASRS codification. For these new parameters, we used the 
taxonomic structure of Appendix D. All these properties that describe the Context and the Outcome 
of the report are formally captured in a first-order language that is used by the GFA tool. 
 
                                                 
*Lecomte, P.; Wanner, J. C.; and Wanner, N. Late runway changes. Unpublished informal communication, 2002. 
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As the Cinq-Demi codification was also available, we decided to incorporate the “error-factor” (part 
of the GOOF grid) in our formal codification. That parameter does not belong to the what, but is part 
of the description of the why. It was not the primary subject of this experiment, but will be exploited 
in Section 7.4. 
 
7.3 Clustering on the What 
 
The what is described through various objective parameters that belong to the “Context” and the 
“Outcome” parts of the Scenario model. Our clustering process starts with the identification of the 
Outcomes involved in the selected set of 40 ICAC reports. As expected, there are only a few 
different ones as they were all associated with In-Close Approach Changes. Then for each group of 
reports associated with a particular Outcome, an analysis of the related Context is conducted. 
 
7.3.1 First Step: Clustering on the Outcome 
As stated before, we used the ASRS taxonomy of anomalies as the codification of the Outcome. 
That taxonomy contains around 60 terms grouped into 13 categories (Aircraft Equipment Problem, 
Airspace Violation, Altitude deviation…). Each of the 40 ASRS reports was identified with one or 
more of these Outcomes. With the Kontex tool, the 40 reports were clustered according to their 
Outcomes. Reports were clustered by each anomaly, and also by each and every combination of the 
anomalies that had been identified within the set of 40 reports. This resulted in 50 concepts 
(clusters); a top-down analysis of these concepts was conducted.8
 
The top-down analysis identified “significant” clusters. A cluster was considered significant if (1) it 
had none or few reports that were shared with other significant clusters, (2) contained a large 
percentage of all of the reports, and (3) collectively, the significant clusters contain nearly all of the 
reports. 
 
This process highlighted four main groups of reports based on four anomalies: “Track or Heading 
Deviation,” “Airborne”, “Ground,” and “Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC).” We point out that the 
three anomalies “Airborne,” “Ground,” and “NMAC” belong to the category called “Conflict” in the 
ASRS taxonomy of anomalies. So, we are able to state that we have identified two main Outcomes 
in the Scenarios of these 40 reports; namely, reports that deal with a spatial deviation (track or 
heading) and reports dealing with a conflict. This first stage of analysis also showed that the ASRS 
anomaly called “Non-Adherence to a Clearance” was often encountered, but it seemed to be a 
shaping factor in the four main groups identified. 
 
In addition, a set of five reports contained all the reports that were not related to any anomaly of the 
taxonomy9 and two exceptions were identified. One exception was linked to an “Aircraft Equipment 
Problem” anomaly and the other one to an “In-Flight Encounter” anomaly. The following table 
summarizes the results. Of the five reports that do not belong to any of the four identified anomaly 
                                                 
8
 Readers interested in how such a top-down analysis is performed can refer to the report by Maille (Maille 2002) where 
a similar analysis is performed for 44 ASRS incident reports. 
9
 Some reports in the ASRS database have no identified anomalies but have been entered into the ASRS database 
because the ASRS experts considered the sequence of events to be interesting from a safety point of view. 
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categories, four reports are linked only to a problem of non-adherence to a procedure (i.e., a FAR or 
a clearance) and one report relates to an altitude deviation.  
 
TABLE 7.1.  CLUSTERS OF REPORTS TO ANOMALIES 
Report #
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Track/Hd * * * * * * * * * * * *
Airborne * * * * * * * * * *
Ground * * *
NMAC * * *
Other * * * * *
InFlight *
Aircraft *
*
 
 
7.3.2 Second step: Clustering on the Context 
In the first step, we clustered the 40 reports by their Outcomes (the ASRS-defined anomalies). In the 
next step, we wanted to cluster on the shared Context within each significant cluster. This Context 
was fully described by the objective parameters as they were provided in the codification of each 
ASRS report. Therefore, we used the Kontex tool once again to cluster on each objective parameter 
and all combinations of objective parameters within a significant cluster of Outcomes. The idea was 
to explore all the possible concepts based on the formal codification of both the Outcome and the 
Context, and to determine whether a specific Context could be associated with each of the four 
particular Outcomes highlighted in the first step. The main results of this second stage of clustering 
and the top-down analysis are summarized here. 
 
“Track and Heading.” The Context shared by the 12 reports identified with this anomaly is: “An 
aircraft is in the approach flight phase to an open and controlled airport. The aircraft is controlled at 
the beginning of the incident by the TRACON.” In addition, in most cases (in 9 of the 12 reports), 
the aircraft was in Class B airspace and parallel runways were active. 
 
“Airborne.” The Context shared by the 10 reports in this category is: “Two aircraft are in the 
vicinity of an open and controlled airport. One of them is in the approach flight phase.” This shared 
Context by itself was not adequately discriminating, but the analyses showed an interesting group of 
6 reports that shared the following properties: “The two aircraft are in the same phase of flight 
(approach) in the Class B airspace. There is some traffic and parallel runways are active.” The four 
other reports shared only the property of being controlled by the tower. 
 
“Ground.” The Context shared by the 4 reports in this category is: “An aircraft is in the approach 
flight phase to an open and controlled airport. The aircraft is controlled by the Tower.” Then further 
analysis shows that the more common situation (3 reports) is that “there is another aircraft and some 
traffic.” The only report without another aircraft in the Context deals with a conflict between the 
first aircraft and airport workers on the runway. 
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“NMAC.” The Context shared by the 3 reports identified with this anomaly is: “Two aircraft are in 
the approach flight phase to an open and controlled airport. Parallel runways are active and there is 
some traffic. One aircraft is a Medium Large Transport (MLT) and the conflict develops while they 
fly in Class B and D airspace.” 
 
At first glance, the four Contexts appear to be similar. Let us highlight their similarities and 
differences. They all deal with “an aircraft in the approach flight phase to an open and controlled 
airport.” This is not a surprise, as it is a direct consequence of our selection of this particular subset 
of 40 reports. Therefore the differences in Contexts rely on a finer level of granularity in the 
descriptions of the Contexts. 
 
We point out, for example, that the three Contexts associated with conflicts (i.e., Airborne, Ground, 
and NMAC) contain the descriptors “traffic” and “2 aircraft” but not the descriptor “TRACON.” 
In contrast, the “Track and Heading” deviation category seems not to be directly influenced by the 
traffic or the presence of another aircraft, but generally starts to develop while the aircraft is still 
under the control of the TRACON (coordination during the transition of control from the TRACON 
to the Tower could be a source of Track and Heading deviations). Conflicts, on the other hand, are, 
as expected, directly related to a problem of traffic and to the simultaneous presence of two aircraft 
around the airport. 
 
The differences in the Contexts associated with the three conflicts are more subtle. First the NMAC 
Context is a special case of the Airborne Context (2 aircraft in the same flight phase, traffic, parallel 
runways, and class B airspace). This is an interesting result as we can also point out that the NMAC 
anomaly is a special case of airborne conflict. What makes the difference between the two contexts 
is that another airspace, D, is also involved in our NMAC Context and one aircraft is a MLT. Thus 
the differences between these two contexts are small, but the anomalies are also quite similar. It will 
require a larger set of reports and more detailed descriptions of the Contexts (more objective 
parameters) to give more reliable conclusions about the differences in what happened in these two 
cases. 
 
We will now focus on the differences that automated clustering reveals in the Contexts associated 
with Ground and Airborne anomalies. The Ground context contains the descriptor tower, but neither 
the same flight phase for the 2 aircraft, nor the class B airspace, nor the parallel runways. Thus, for 
these 40 reports, airborne conflicts generally entail the presence of two aircraft in the same flight 
phase to an airport where parallel runways are active. In contrast, Ground conflicts develop only 
under tower control and are not directly linked to parallel-runway configuration, just as one would 
expect. 
 
7.4 An Attempt to Capture the Why 
 
As stated previously in this report, we have introduced into the formal codification one part of the 
Cinq-Demi taxonomy, which captures some conditions conducive to human error. This part related 
to understanding the Behavior of the Scenario was not a primary aim of this small case study, but as 
the Cinq-Demi codification was available, it required only a little additional work to see if there 
were interesting results. 
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The study of these added parameters indicated that nearly all the conflicts were associated with a 
misrepresentation of risk by the air traffic controller. (The concept of misrepresentation is first 
introduced by Cinq-Demi as presented in Appendix B and is discussed further in Section 9 and 
Appendix E in this report.) Thus the behavior of the controller seemed to greatly influence the 
possible occurrence of a conflict. 
 
The reports dealing with track and heading deviations seemed to be split into two clusters, 
depending on whether or not the flight crew had a correct representation of the trajectory of the 
aircraft. Thus either the behavior of the flight crew or that of the air traffic controller was a primary 
factor in the deviation. Moreover, for nearly all of the track and heading deviations, workload was a 
concern, while it seemed to be a marginal parameter in the case of conflicts. 
 
7.5 Conclusions of the Case Study 
 
This limited experiment showed that, within the phase of flight selected for the Context of these 40 
reports, a first clustering process based on the description of the Outcome generated well-separated 
groups of reports. Then, the analysis of the related Contexts was able to point out discriminating 
parameters (e.g., active parallel runways and aircraft in the same phase of flight were related to 
airborne conflicts, while the transition from the TRACON control to the tower control was more 
relevant to track and heading deviations). Of course, with a so small a number of reports, one should 
be careful about the reliability and the generalization of the results. The purpose of this study was to 
test the value of the model, and not so much to come to conclusions about the links between 
Contexts and Outcomes in this small set of reports. 
 
Moreover, the rough codification of the why shows that misrepresentation seems to be a common 
factor in all four of the anomalous outcomes of ICAC, and that some subjective parameters (for 
instance, workload) can be a contributing factor to some anomalies (or to some contexts). 
Furthermore, the indications are that the major clustering criteria for Behavior could be the person 
who had an anomalous behavior. 
 
 
8 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OUTCOMES AND CONTEXTS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The Scenario model is concerned with the relationships among the Contextual factors of the last safe 
state, Behaviors, and anomalous Outcomes of a safety incident. We decided to examine ASRS data 
for evidence of such relationships.10 In the fixed fields of the coded forms, ASRS database records 
contain a good deal of structured information relating to the Context and Outcomes of reported 
safety events, but very little structured information relating to the Behaviors of the people and 
automation that contributed to the events. Therefore, we limited this initial examination of ASRS 
                                                 
10
 This section of this research report summarizes work done by a team of researchers from Battelle Pacific Northwest 
Division. The team, under the leadership of Dr. Thomas Ferryman, included Ms. Amanda White, Dr. Christian Posse, 
and Ms. Andrea Swickard. 
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data to the relationship between the context of reported incidents and their outcomes, exclusively. 
Our intent was to extract behavioral data from ASRS narratives11 and incorporate those data into an 
expanded future analysis if this initial investigation proved fruitful. 
 
8.2 Goals 
 
The goals of this investigation were to determine whether: 
1. There are statistically significant relationships in ASRS incident reports between coded 
Contextual Factors, on the one hand, and coded anomalous Outcomes, on the other. 
2. Any such statistical relationships that are observed in ASRS data are amenable to operational 
interpretation by subject-matter experts. 
 
8.3 Approach 
 
During this research effort we: 
1. Created a structured analysis table from the ASRS data.12
2. Examined the statistical relationships between contextual factors and anomalies using the (a) 
classification and regression tree (CART) method, and (b) cross-tabulation analysis. 
3. Clustered the contextual factors found in the ASRS data into groups based (roughly) on their 
frequency/infrequency of co-occurrence. These groups can be thought of as recurring Contextual 
Patterns. 
4. Examined the statistical relationships between Contextual Patterns and anomalous Outcomes 
using cross-tabulation analysis. 
5. Developed graphical depictions of the results of both CART and cross-tabulation analyses to aid 
their interpretation. 
6. Presented the findings to subject-matter experts (SMEs) to determine whether the patterns 
revealed by the statistical analyses were operationally plausible. 
 
This section of the current report summarizes the approach and findings of that investigation. 
 
8.3.1 Data/Taxonomies 
Data for this research were obtained from the ASRS database. The active ASRS database contained 
109,225 records within the scope at the time the data request was made. 
 
                                                 
11
 ASRS report narratives are a rich source of information regarding the behaviors of pilots, air traffic controllers, other 
persons, and automated agents during the course of safety events. However, the unstructured nature of these data 
creates an analytical challenge. 
12
 Each row in the table corresponded to a reported ASRS incident. Columns described the contextual factors present 
during the reported event and an anomalous outcome that resulted. Since any given ASRS report may describe more 
than one anomaly, some reported events appear more than once in the analysis table. 
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Scope of Database 
The scope of the analysis was limited to ASRS incidents involving at least one air transport on a 
passenger or freight mission flying under Part 121 rules.  
 
Contextual Factors 
As noted previously in Section 4 and Appendix C, many contextual factors relevant to safety 
incidents are encoded in ASRS fixed fields. The coded Contextual Factors used in this study fall into 
the following categories: 
• Time including year, month, day of week, and quarter of day 
• Place including altitude, location (airport, intersection, etc.) and involved ATC facilities 
• Physical environment including flight conditions (VMC/IMC), ceiling, visibility, and light 
conditions (dawn, day, dusk, night) 
• Aircraft characteristics including make-model (implicitly, weight, number of engines, etc.), 
mission, navigational-method-in-use, and flight phase 
• Hazardous situational factors including problematic airport configurations, airspace 
designs, departure/approach procedures, navigational aid configurations, and ATC/airport 
procedures. 
 
We used 257 ASRS contextual factor codes that fall into the above categories.13 This set of fixed 
fields was supplemented with 267 context-related words extracted from the report narratives. CART 
analysis can accommodate large numbers of potential explanatory variables. However, cross-
tabulation analyses lose statistical significance when cell sizes become too small. Thus, for the 
purposes of the cross-tabulation analysis, it was necessary to cluster ASRS contextual factors into 
Contextual Patterns (groups of Contextual Factors evidenced by very frequent or very infrequent 
co-occurrence). 
 
We arrived at these contextual patterns using standard clustering methods. The raw data evidenced 
2,882 distinct Contextual Factor sets (excluding location identifiers). A hierarchical clustering 
method was used to group these into ten Contextual Patterns. These are broadly described in 
table 8-1. Each ASRS report was associated with one of these ten Contextual Patterns based on its 
proximity to Pattern centroids. 
 
                                                 
13
 We did not treat individual locations as distinct contextual factors. If we had, the number of such factors would have 
been measured in the thousands. 
28 
TABLE 8-1.  KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 10 DOMINANT CONTEXTUAL 
PATTERNS OBSERVED IN THE ASRS DATA SET 
Pattern 
Contextual Factors  
Unusually Present  
in Pattern Members 
Contextual Factors 
Rarely Present  
in Pattern Members 
1 Climb phase Thunderstorm; military/small aircraft 
2 Adverse weather Military aircraft, special purpose aircraft, 
ultralights; 
3 Military aircraft, special-purpose 
aircraft, ultralights; adverse weather 
 
4 Descent phase Small aircraft; adverse weather 
5 Military fighters and trainers; mid-
size transports 
Adverse weather (except 
thunderstorms) 
6 Ground phase Adverse weather 
7 Precipitation and obscuration 
factors; military aircraft 
Cruise phase 
8  Military aircraft; adverse weather factors
9 Landing phase Military aircraft, special purpose-aircraft, 
ultralights; adverse weather 
10 Military aircraft, special-purpose 
aircraft, ultralights 
Adverse weather 
 
 
 
Outcome Categories 
We selected ten anomalous Outcome categories from among the anomalies defined in Appendix D 
for our analysis. These categories were selected by subject-matter experts. The chosen Outcomes 
were easily mapped to ASRS database codes. Table 8-2 shows the chosen Outcomes and the 
corresponding ASRS Anomaly codes. Any given aviation safety incident may involve more than one 
adverse Outcome. For example, many ASRS incident reports that involve Outcomes 1 through 8 (or 
10) also fall under Outcome 9, Non-Adherence to Rules. Thus, some reported incidents appear more 
than once in the analysis data set. 
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TABLE 8-2. ANOMALOUS OUTCOME CATEGORIES USED IN THE STUDY14
Outcome Category 
Set Label Relevant ASRS Anomaly Codes 
# of 
Reports 
1 Aircraft Equipment 
Problems 
Aircraft_Equipment_Problem.Critical 
Aircraft_Equipment_Problem.Less_Severe 
21,802 
2 Altitude Deviation Altitude_Deviation.Overshoot 
Altitude_Deviation.Undershoot 
8,018 
3 Airborne Conflict Conflict.Airborne_Critical 
Conflict.Airborne_Less_Severe 
Conflict.NMAC 
14,427 
4 Ground Conflict Conflict.Ground_Critical 
Conflict.Ground_Less_Severe 
4,637 
5 Runway Incursions15* Incursion.Runway.Other 4,201 
6 Landings without Clearance Incursion.Landing_Without_Clearance 1,057 
7 Inflight Weather Encounters Inflight_Encounter.Weather 4,472 
8 Maintenance Problems Maintenance_Problem.Improper_Documentation 
Maintenance_Problem.Improper_Maintenance 
2,371 
9 Non Adherence to Rules Non_Adherence.Clearance 
Non_Adherence.FAR  
Non_Adherence.Published_Procedure 
47,748 
10 Airspace Violations Airspace_Violation.Entry 490  
 
 
8.4 Results 
 
8.4.1 CART Analyses 
Three Classification And Regression Tree (CART) analyses were performed. These analyses 
differed with respect to the contextual factors that were used as explanatory variables as follows: 
 Analysis 1: Used 257 contextual factors drawn from ASRS fixed fields 
 Analysis 2: Used a reduced set of 84 contextual factors drawn from ASRS fixed fields 
 Analysis 3: Used 267 context-related words drawn from the ASRS report narratives. 
 
Analyses 1 and 2, which relied on ASRS fixed fields as the source of contextual information, 
seemed to produce the best results. One plausible explanation is that the coding in ASRS fixed 
fields, which draws on all information in the ASRS reporting form, is more consistent than 
contextual references in report narratives. Table 8-3 provides summary output for Analysis 2 which 
yielded the most useful CART results. 
                                                 
14
 There were 109,225 reports in total in the ASRS data set from which these observations were drawn. 
15
 The ASRS defines a runway incursion to include any use of a runway that is not authorized by ATC. Thus, ASRS 
Anomaly Code “Incursion.Runway.Other” would be more properly labeled “Runway Incursions Other Than 
Landings Without Clearance.” Landings without clearance were separately categorized for the instant analysis as 
Outcome Category Set 6. 
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TABLE 8-3. CART ANALYSIS RESULTS SHOWING CONNECTIONS AMONG 
84 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS CODED IN ASRS FIXED-FIELDS AND 
ANOMALOUS OUTCOMES 
Outcome Category 
Set Label 
Contextual Factors with  
the Most Statistical Explanatory Power 
1 Aircraft Equipment 
Problems 
Mission is passenger, flight phase is climbout~intermediate altitude, 
climbout~takeoff, other~emergency, other~divert, cruise~level, 
cruise~other, ground~preflight or ground~parked, may involve a low-
wing aircraft or widebody transport, mission is passenger 
2 Altitude Deviation Flight phase is climbout~intermediate altitude or descent~other or 
descent~intermediate altitude 
3 Airborne Conflict Two or more crews involved, flight phase is cruise~level, cruise~other, 
climbout~initial, climbout~takeoff, descent~approach, two or more 
aircraft involved, low-wing aircraft 
4 Ground Conflict Two or more crews involved and flight phase is ground~other, 
ground~holding, ground~preflight, ground~taxi, ground~parked, 
climbout~takeoff, landing~roll or landing~other, aircraft may be 
widebody or medium large transport 
5 Runway Incursions 
(other)16 * 
Two or more crews involved, flight phase is ground~other, ground~taxi, 
ground~hold, ground~position and hold 
6 Landings without 
Clearance 
Flight phase is landing~other, landing~roll or descent~approach, may 
involve 2 or more crews 
7 Inflight Weather 
Encounters 
Flight phase is cruise~other, descent~approach, descent~other or 
landing~other, may involve high-wing aircraft or 2 or more crews 
8 Maintenance 
Problems 
Flight phase is ground~maintenance, ground~parked or cruise~level, 
may involve low-wing aircraft 
9 Non Adherence to 
Rules 
No positive evidence 
10 Airspace Violations Flight phase is cruise~level, may involve low-wing aircraft  
 
 
8.4.2 Cross-Tabulation Analysis 
We cross-tabulated the data set using the ten identified Contextual Patterns as the rows and ten 
chosen anomalous Outcomes as the columns. We then computed the ratio between the observed 
number of observations in each cell and the statistically expected number of observations. Figure 9 
shows the results. It is color-coded to highlight ratios that are unexpectedly high and those that are 
unexpectedly low. 
 
                                                 
16
 The ASRS defines a runway incursion to include any use of a runway that is not authorized by ATC. Under this 
definition, an unauthorized landing is a type of runway incursion. Thus, Outcome Category 5, Runway Incursions. 
Others should be understood to mean “runway incursions other than landings without clearance.” Landings without 
clearance were separately categorized as Outcome 6 for the purposes of this study. 
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Figure 8. Cross-tabulation results showing ratio of observed over expected cell frequencies. 
 
Figure 8 clearly reveals strong statistical relationships between the Contextual Patterns and 
anomalous Outcomes described in ASRS incident reports. For example, Context 2 (roughly, adverse 
weather) is negatively correlated with Outcome 6 (landings without ATC clearance). This is 
consistent with prior ASRS research that suggested that most landings without clearance occur in 
VMC conditions. Favorable weather can contribute to flight crew complacency and associated errors 
of omission. Context 10 (roughly, the presence of military or special purpose aircraft in adverse 
weather) appears to significantly increase the statistical likelihood of Outcome 3 (airborne conflicts). 
Subject matter experts agree that airborne conflicts are more likely to arise when aircraft with very 
different performance characteristics (e.g., air transports, military aircraft, or special-purpose 
aircraft) are in the same traffic mix. This potential is heightened in marginal weather conditions. 
Similar interpretations can be made of a number of other statistical relationships observed in the 
cross-tabulation results. 
 
8.5 Lessons Learned 
 
While far from definitive, the research described in this chapter yielded some important lessons. 
First, we are encouraged to believe that relationships that are both statistically and operationally 
meaningful exist between Contextual Factors/Patterns, on the one hand, and specific types of 
unwanted aviation safety Outcomes, on the other. Second, we recognize that the multiplicity of 
contextual factors that may be present during aviation safety events creates analytical challenges 
(i.e., the dimensionality needs to be reduced through recurrent pattern identification). Third, we 
recognize the danger that studies such as these can produce analytical results that are tautologies 
(things true by definition) rather than true insights. This happens when an Outcome has contextual 
factors built into its definition (e.g., landings without clearance, by definition, occur during the 
landing phase). Fourth, we better understand the importance of bringing domain expertise into the 
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research process at the beginning of the research study rather than reserving its application to the 
interpretation of research results at the end. Domain expertise can be used to achieve dimensionality 
reduction based on operational rather than mathematical considerations, identify implicit tautologies, 
and otherwise assist study design and execution. 
 
 
9 ON THE CODIFICATION OF THE WHY 
 
 
We now come to the primary purpose of this study. 
 
In Section 5, we described our concept of the Scenario,  
 
 SCENARIO = {CONTEXT + BEHAVIOR ! OUTCOME} 
 
in which we consider the Context to be that of the last safe state and the Behavior results in the 
transition to the Outcome. When the Outcome is an anomalous (unwanted or compromised) state, 
the last safe state is identified as a precursor. 
 
In the experiment discussed in Section 8, we clustered incidents on the basis of similar patterns of 
parametric values defining their Contexts and their Outcomes. We have adequately described what 
happened, but we have not yet identified the causal factors of the Behavior that produced the 
transition from the last safe state to the unwanted Outcome – the why. For this, we must rely on a 
second stage of clustering. We will use the results of clustering on what combined with domain 
knowledge to minimize the extent of the world that the automated tools must consider in this second 
stage of clustering. 
 
In order to answer the most important human-factors questions about an incident, we must extract 
causal information from the free narrative of the incident report. We need not do a perfect job of 
this. The identification of what happened in the first stage of clustering already achieves much of 
what is needed for an effective retrospective search. Furthermore, our aim is not a definitive 
explanation of why a given incident occurred. We cannot expect to automate a completely reliable 
understanding of the why. We only need the capability to expedite a search on the why, to enable an 
exploration of their commonalities, and to minimize the labor of the human expert in arriving at a 
satisfactory explanation. It is sufficient to restrict the space of possible causal factors, and, in some 
cases, to identify a set of related incidents that includes almost all those that would be selected by an 
expert as similar to the target incident. 
 
It is fortunate that we do not have to be perfect in automatically extracting the precise why events 
happened, because this study is based solely on ASRS incident reports. As products of a voluntary 
reporting system, the reports in the database have some inherent limitations. They cannot be viewed 
as a random sample of the population of aviation incidents, they may contain reporting biases, and 
their factual correctness cannot be verified. Moreover, retrospective experiential reports like the 
ASRS reports are not reliable reports about why incidents happened. Ericsson and Simon (1993) 
have reviewed and analyzed many decades’ worth of research on the uses of verbal reports. They 
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repeatedly emphasize two points, both of which are relevant and of concern to our experiment based 
on aviation incident reports: 
• People have no ability to verbalize their own perceptual and cognitive processes. But it is 
precisely the understanding of the perceptual and cognitive processes that is fundamental to 
identifying the causal factors of the Behavior. 
• People have little or no ability to provide any accurate information about their performance 
or cognition after a short time has passed. However, ASRS reports are usually provided 
several hours after the target events. 
 
Furthermore, people cannot report on the perceptual and retrieval processes that determine which 
thoughts or patterns reached their attention or why a given thought was attended. Perhaps the best 
we can hope for is a sequentially correct report of the most salient attended objects and events, 
especially those attended during impasses in normal, smooth performance. For the most part, the 
reported events will relate to the what, but when they are related to why, they are almost certain to be 
directly linked to concrete perceptual factors. While this source of our information about the why 
may be flawed, it is nevertheless the best source we have for the operator’s perspective of the 
incident, and it deserves to be mined for whatever information it contains. 
 
In this second stage of automated analysis, we need to rely on knowledge of human behavior to 
narrow the possibilities of the why in order to “aim” the automated system in the proper direction. In 
fact, at this stage of the research, we are willing to omit many plausible (albeit rare) causal factors of 
human behavior (such as physiological and psychomotor factors) if we can aid the analyst in the 
identification of a few important common ones. In our initial attempt to cope with this complex 
problem, we propose that the Behavior entailed in transitioning from the safe state to a compromised 
or anomalous state of the Outcome is always associated with a loss of “Situation Awareness.” 
 
Endsley (1988) defines Situation Awareness (SA) as a person’s “perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future.” SA is a label that is often used to refer to many of the 
cognitive processes entailed in attentional dynamics, maintenance of a world model, and prediction. 
This definition fits well with our view of Behavior as we use it in the concept of Scenario. 
Moreover, the concept of associating any Behavior that results in an anomalous Outcome with a 
failure of Situation Awareness fits with our objective of identifying systemic factors conducive to 
human error. SA is concerned with the operational state of an expert human performer in a dynamic 
and potentially dangerous environment. In our aviation world, we are considering pilots and air-
traffic controllers operating in the global civil aviation environment. Other studies of SA have 
focused on challenging military operations, such as command and control in joint-operations 
combat. Still others have studied automobile drivers, anesthesiologists, space mission ground-
controllers, and firefighters. We base our approach on the substantial body of literature reporting on 
a variety of perspectives of SA and its role in human behavior. (See, for example, Durso and 
Gronlund 1999, Shively et al. 1997, and Sohn and Doane 2000.) 
 
SA is the converse of the concept of Misrepresentation that is an “Error Factor” in Cinq-Demi’s 
GOOF grid. (See Appendix B.) Cinq-Demi uses Misrepresentation to mean situations when the 
model used by the operator to understand events and act accordingly is, for any reason, not 
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consistent with the “real world.” Misrepresentation involves the reporter’s failure to update his or 
her mental model of system status; it can also involve use of a decision model that may be generally 
valid, but is too simple, or is inappropriate to the reported situation. Misrepresentation is viewed 
here as synonymous with loss of Situation Awareness. 
 
This notion—that the loss of SA (or Misrepresentation) always underlies the Behavior associated 
with the transition from a safe state to a compromised or anomalous state—has some justification, at 
least with regard to ASRS reports. In every study we have conducted in which the full analyses 
using the Cinq-Demi methodology have been applied to ASRS reports, we have concluded that 
Misrepresentation dominated all of the Error Factors. Further, experienced ASRS analysts agree that 
“Misrepresentation” (in its most general interpretation) is the dominant factor in, by far, the majority 
of the ASRS reports in the database, except in some cases of equipment failure. 
 
Hartel et al. (1991) found SA to be the leading causal factor in a review of 175 military aviation 
mishaps. Endsley (1995a) investigated the causal factors underlying aircraft accidents involving 
major air carriers from 1989 to 1992. Of 24 accidents, 17 involved human error and, of these, 15 
were associated with a failure of Situation Awareness. Endsley concluded, “This study provides 
good evidence that problems with Situation Awareness are indeed a primary factor underlying 
aviation accidents.” This conclusion was further validated by the results of the studies reported in 
Jones and Endsley (1996) and Gibson et al. (1997), although these entailed only small subsets of 
incident reports from the ASRS database. 
 
Therefore, it may not be too extreme to start with the assumption that the human behavior failures of 
every incident entail loss of Situation Awareness, especially as the ASRS database will be our 
resource for experiments. This provides us with a model to guide the automated clustering. 
Moreover, the automated clustering processes to be used in this experiment lend themselves to 
testing this assumed model, as will be described later. 
 
However, SA by itself is non-constructive and insufficiently discriminating. To make progress with 
the analysis and measurement of our conceptual model, it is necessary to break SA down into more 
concrete and constructive components. Fortunately, we can draw on an extensive SA research 
literature to accomplish this. (See Appendix E for a discussion of this literature and research in 
related domains of human factors, skilled performance, and behavioral decision theory. Appendix E 
also discusses some of the complex processes and interactions that we are ignoring in this initial 
experiment.) 
 
The human-factors research community (see, for example, Endsley 2000a, Endsley 2000b, and 
Shively, R. J., et al. 1997) has identified the following sequential stages or aspects of Situation 
Awareness: 
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SITUATION AWARENESS 
 
DETECTION 
 
RECOGNITION 
 
INTERPRETATION 
 
COMPREHENSION 
 
PREDICTION 
 
 
We propose that the discriminating factors of Behavior in our model of Scenario are failures to 
Detect, Recognize, Interpret, Comprehend, or Predict. (See Appendix E for descriptions of each of 
these five components of SA.) 
 
There are three benefits to our experiment that can be realized by adopting this breakdown of 
Situation Awareness. First, the determinants are constructive in the sense that each might be 
identifiable with specific words or phrases in a set of reports. Second, they are constructive in the 
sense that we may be able to relate each to specific objective parameters of the Contexts and 
Outcomes of each Scenario. Third, as they are naturally sequential, they have the potential for 
augmenting the information on the sequence of events (or sub-events) during the transition from the 
last safe state to the outcome. All of these features can be useful to “tuning” the automated analyses 
of this second stage, as will be described later. 
 
A number of previous studies have highlighted levels or stages of SA that are closely related to our 
list of discriminating components: Detection, Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, and 
Prediction (DRICP). For example, Endsley developed the taxonomy in table 9-1 for classifying and 
describing errors in SA (Endsley 1994, 1995a, and 1995b). The factors affecting SA at each of the 
three levels of table 9-1 correspond to the components of SA we propose to use. Detection and 
Recognition are necessary for Level 1 SA (Endsley 1996, 2000a, and 2000b). Interpretation and 
Comprehension are necessary for Level 2 SA (Endsley 1996, 2000a, and 2000b). A person with 
Level 2 SA has been able to derive operationally relevant meaning and significance from the Level 1 
data perceived. Endsley 2000a and 2000b emphasizes that the defining role of prediction is the 
highest level (Level 3) of SA. We may well find that it is not possible to discriminate automatically 
to the five levels of detail of our taxonomy, in which case we will try to adapt our analyses to 
Endsley’s three-level taxonomy of perception, comprehension, and projection. In any case, 
Endsley’s lower-level descriptions of each of the three levels in table 9-1 will help us develop 
representative concepts, words, or phrases that a reporter of an incident might use to indicate the 
components of SA. 
 
Jones and Endsley (1996) found that experts achieved a limited degree of success in categorizing a 
small sub-set of ASRS reports at these three levels of table 9-1. They also found that the distribution 
of errors among the three SA Levels in the 143 ASRS incident reports of this study was comparable 
to that found in a previous study of 17 NTSB accident reports (Endsley 1995b). 
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TABLE 9-1.  TAXONOMY OF LEVELS OF SITUATION AWARENESS 
Level 1: Fail to perceive information or misperception of information 
• Data not available 
• Hard to discriminate or detect data 
• Failure to monitor or observe data 
• Misperception of data 
• Memory loss 
Level 2: Improper integration or comprehension of information 
• Lack of or incomplete mental model 
• Use of incorrect mental model 
• Over-reliance on default values 
• Other 
Level 3: Incorrect projection of future actions of the system 
• Lack of or incomplete mental model 
• Over-projection of current trends 
• Other 
 
With this assumed model of Behavior, we now have a taxonomy of sequential, constructive, 
discriminating factors of Behavior that could help explain the why and how of an incident. We next 
need to identify which of these behavioral factors (i.e., failure to Detect, Recognize, Interpret, 
Comprehend, or Predict) were present in the Scenario of the subset of incident reports developed 
from the first stage of clustering on what happened. Then we need to identify the objective factors of 
the Context that are related to the identified behavioral factors. 
 
Accordingly, in order to maximize the potential of the automated extraction of this information, we 
expect to do the following in the experiments that we will conduct during the next year: (This 
corresponds to the second stage of clustering in the procedure diagrammed in figure 9.): 
1. An expert in human factors will work with operational experts (ASRS analysts) to develop 
representative concepts, words, or phrases that a reporter of an incident might use to indicate the 
components of SA (DRICP). Examples are presented in table 9-2. 
2. We will then use such exemplary phrases with the tool called QUORUM-Perilog (McGreevy 
and Statler 1998) to search the entire ASRS database for similar phrases. On the basis of that 
search, we will develop a set of words, phrases, and phraseologies related to each of the 
discriminating components, DRICP, of SA. 
3. With the help of operational domain experts and experts in human factors, we will develop 
subsets of the previously labeled subjective factors that relate to each of the components of SA. 
We will then use the set of phrases developed in step 2 above, together with the subset of 
subjective factors associated with each of the discriminating components of SA, to “tune” the 
automated analysis in the second stage of clustering. This second stage will cluster reports by 
similarity of the failures in SA (i.e., failure to detect and/or to recognize and/or to identify, etc.) 
that occurred from each cluster of incident reports identified in the first stage of analysis as 
similar on the basis of what happened.  
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TABLE 9-2.  REPRESENTATIVE TEXTUAL EXPRESSIONS 
 Concepts Words Phrases 
Lack of 
Detection 
threshold, change, 
adaptation level, 
signal quality, 
discrimination, noise 
did not notice, see, 
hear, monitor 
I did not notice that the 
MCW light was on. 
We were not monitoring 
altitude. 
Lack of 
Recognition 
attention, familiarity, 
type/kind/category, 
importance 
misunderstood, 
misread, mis-heard, 
confused, unknown, 
novel, new, unfamiliar 
An unfamiliar annunciation 
appeared on the MCP. 
PNF mis-heard the 
clearance. 
Lack of 
Interpretation 
relations, reasoning, 
language, training, 
specialized knowledge
incorrectly, not fully, 
incompletely; not 
realize meaning, 
importance 
CAPT did not realize how 
soon we needed to start the 
descent. 
Lack of 
Comprehension 
causality, explanation, 
diagnosis, 
intervention, FDIR 
lost track of, mistake, 
wrong, error, why, 
misunderstand 
We did not understand why 
the altitude capture failed. 
(notice in this case how 
detection, recognition, and 
interpretation are satisfied: 
the altitude capture failed is 
an interpretation of cockpit 
information that has been 
detected and recognized; 
still there can be a 
comprehension failure) 
Lack of 
Prediction 
prediction, 
preparation, 
expectation, 
prevention, avoidance 
not expect, 
unexpected, 
unforeseen, not 
remember to 
The weather had 
deteriorated at our alternate. 
We got an unexpected 
runway change. 
 
 
4. Again, an expert in human factors will work with ASRS analysts to identify which of the 
objective parameters of the Context might relate to a failure of each of the discriminating 
components of SA (i.e., which of the objective parameters might contribute to a failure to Detect, 
which to a failure to Recognize, which to a failure to Interpret, which to a failure to 
Comprehend, and which to a failure to Predict). This step is intended to guide the automated 
search of the next step. 
5. The automated analysis in Step 3 identifies which of the components of SA pertain to the 
Behavior of the common Scenario in a cluster of incident reports. Next we will automatically 
compare the objective parameters of the Context for that Scenario with the list of those 
parameters that the experts identified as relevant to each of the pertinent components of SA. This 
comparison will enable us to identify the subset of objective parameters of the Context that is 
related to each of the discriminating factors of the Behavior identified with that Scenario. 
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6. After identifying which of the components of SA are entailed in the Scenario, it might be 
possible to extract some information about the chronology (linkage) of the sub-events from the 
natural sequence of the components of SA by relating these to their corresponding existing 
contextual factors. The consequent completion of the Scenario that includes this chronology of 
the contextual factors and their relationship to the components of SA permits the postulation of 
effective intervention. 
 
We use the DRICP framework as though Detection, Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, 
and Prediction occur in sequential order, each successive stage using the output of the preceding 
stage. This simplification is both necessary and justifiable in the initial part of our work. It is 
necessary to keep the analysis tractable, and it is justifiable because there is every reason to believe 
that ASRS reports are usually delivered as sequential narratives. 
 
However, as Carroll et al. (2001) documents, citing Neisser (1976), human cognition is a cyclic 
process in which prediction facilitates comprehension and interpretation, and in which 
comprehensible and interpretable events are more easily detected and recognized than are 
unpredictable and incomprehensible events. In fact, Jones and Endsley (1996) point out that many 
Level 2 SA errors (for example, misinterpretation of landmarks) can be attributed to incorrect 
expectations (erroneous predictions), which then cause a persistent misrecognition and 
misinterpretation of perceptual data. 
 
During the next year, we expect to conduct the experiment described above, applying the paradigm 
of Situational Awareness to automated clustering on the parameters extracted from ASRS incident 
reports associated with erroneous human Behavior. We will present the results of this experiment in 
a subsequent report. 
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Sequence of failure modes of SA and existing 
objective factors.
Domain expert prescribed inputs
Automated analyses
Outputs of automated analyses
Data sources
Automated Analyses
Step 1
Identified existing objective factors
Identified existing anomalous outcome
Domain (e.g., Phase of Flight, Type of A/C, etc.)
Possible Anomalous Outcomes
Possible Objective and Subjective FactorsP
re
sc
ri
b
ed
Subset of ASRS Reports
Identified existing objective factors related to each of 
the identified failure modes of Situational Awareness
Prescribed objective factors 
related to each of the failure 
modes of situation awareness
Automated Analyses
Step 3
Prescribed phrases 
and subjective factors 
related to each of the 
factors of situation 
awareness
Automated Analyses
Step 2
Identified failure modes 
of situation awareness
Free text narratives
Figure 9. Process for second-stage analysis. 
 
 
10 SUMMARY AND PROJECTIONS 
 
 
In this study, we have defined a generic structure of information (a taxonomic model) that is 
postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between incidents like those described in 
ASRS-like aviation incident reports. On the basis of this structure, we have introduced the 
simplifying structure of the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what 
happened based on the objective parameters that define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario. 
 
We assume that it is possible to design an automated clustering process guided by the structure of 
the Scenario, and that the results will be easy for human experts to understand. We have identified 
the “full and complete” set of parameters that define the Context of the initial safe state, and the 
anomalous Outcome. Our assumption is that this complete set of parameters adequately describes 
what happened. Automated tools will use the values of these parameters to identify the Scenario and 
to cluster similar scenarios from the ASRS database based on what happened. We have 
demonstrated the potential of this approach in the experiments described in this report. 
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The limited experiment of the “Case Study” discussed in Section 7 showed, within the limitations of 
the small number of reports used, the value of the Scenario model for clustering reports based on 
similarities of Context plus Outcome. Moreover, the rough codification of the why for this small set 
of reports showed that misrepresentation was a common factor and identified some subjective 
parameters that can be contributing factors to Behavior. This experiment encouraged us to continue 
with our approach to analyzing free text for information on why an incident occurred. 
 
Then we used our current automated capabilities to cluster the objective parameters as they are 
coded in the current ASRS database. We considered the dominant cluster to be representative of the 
Context of each Scenario, and determined that there are certain common dominant factors associated 
with each anomalous Outcome. We cross-tabulated the data set using ten identified Contextual 
Patterns as the rows and ten chosen anomalous Outcomes as the columns. We then computed the 
ratio between the observed number of observations in each cell and the statistically expected number 
of observations. We concluded that relationships that are both statistically and operationally 
meaningful exist between Contextual Factors/Patterns, on the one hand, and specific types of 
unwanted aviation safety Outcomes, on the other. We recognized that the multiplicity of contextual 
factors that may be present during aviation safety events creates analytical challenges (i.e., the 
dimensionality needs to be reduced through recurrent pattern identification). 
 
This report has presented a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of 
aviation accident or incident reports, and consistently and reliably analyzing them for objective 
factors (the what of an incident) as well as the causal factors of human behavior (the why of an 
incident). We have proposed a method for applying the paradigm of Situational Awareness—with its 
five components of Detection, Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction—to 
automated clustering on the objective and subjective parameters associated with erroneous human 
Behavior from the free-text narrative of an incident report. Noting that the discriminating 
components of SA have a natural sequence, or chronology that can be linked with event chains, we 
have postulated the possibility of identifying effective interventions for the elements of human error 
identified in incident and accident data. 
 
We have assumed a very simple model for describing the human behavior associated with the 
transition to an anomalous state in our concept of the Scenario. There are likely other factors besides 
loss of SA that could influence transitions in some scenarios. However, the research literature 
documents the very high frequency with which human error can be related to loss of SA. Certainly, 
not all of the contextual factors of the last safe state prevail unchanged throughout the transition, and 
those changes both influence and are influenced by the human actions on the system. Also, it is clear 
that human cognition is a cyclic process and not the simple sequential process of our DRICP 
framework. Nevertheless, we maintain that our simplified model of Scenario and Behavior is both 
necessary and justifiable in this first generation of automated analyses of free text. It is necessary to 
keep the analysis tractable within currently available capabilities, and it is justifiable because there is 
every reason to believe that ASRS reports are usually delivered as sequential narratives. The 
research process will be designed to continuously question our assumptions, and our simplifications 
will be corrected as required through future investigations. 
 
The plan is to continue to develop and enhance the automated capability to correlate Context and 
Outcome by incorporating additional domain knowledge. For this first-generation process, we 
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believe that it is essential to (1) maximize the information from the objective parameters about what 
happened in order to minimize the domain for analyzing why it happened, and (2) assume a 
simplified model of Behavior to begin to analyze automatically for an understanding of why. In the 
experiment to be conducted during the next year, we will evaluate the ability to automatically extract 
useful information about why a set of similar incidents occurred based on this simplified model. 
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT TOOLS 
 
 
Several commercially available tools have been evaluated in queries of the ASRS database: 
 
BRIO: Enables the performance of a Boolean search (SQL-like) on the relational database 
containing the codified part of the incident. Moreover, it enables a search for words in the free-text 
section. This tool is efficient and widely used for retrospective searches. The user must know how to 
formulate a “good” question in order to use BRIO effectively. 
 
QUORUM: QUORUM-Perilog is a set of methods and software for data mining of text and other 
sequences of symbols. QUORUM measures the degree of contextual association of large numbers of 
word pairs in narratives and other text to produce models that capture the contextual structure of the 
text. It compares models to measure their degree of similarity. The QUORUM tool is primarily 
dedicated to retrospective searches, rather than analyses. 
 
Vivísimo Clustering Engine™: Interfaces with any document database to automatically organize 
search or database query results into hierarchical folders of categories that are selected from the 
words and phrases contained in the search results themselves. In a small experiment on a subset of 
ASRS reports, Vivísimo was found to be easy to run and was able to identify operationally pertinent 
concepts and exemplars. However, it was more effective when used on categorical fields than on 
free text, and the preprocessing of vocabulary was an important enabling step. 
 
Battelle PNWD methodology: A new set of tools has been developed in order to mine the ASRS 
database and build clusters without knowing what we are looking for. This methodology uses 
domain knowledge to standardize the language of the free text for processing (an automated filtering 
process called PLADS), statistical tools to identify clusters and super clusters (Matlab), and a 
software dedicated to navigating the hierarchical structure (called ALAN). The AUTOMATIC 
LANGUAGE ANALYSIS NAVIGATOR (ALAN) is a text comprehension tool that clusters textual 
data. ALAN identifies aviation safety reports that have similar topics, or identifies clusters of reports 
that are similar to a given exemplar (Willse et al. 2002). 
 
The heart of the ALAN methodology relies on the extraction of a signature for each report. The 
signature and the definition of the similarity between two signatures are based on word counting in 
the free text. Results of clustering are often difficult to understand from an operational perspective, 
they do not provide automated identification of precursors, and they cannot be used to build an 
intervention strategy for a critical situation. Research is currently being conducted to make better use 
of domain knowledge to improve the efficiency and the operational relevance of the clustering tools. 
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APPENDIX B: THE CINQ-DEMI METHODOLOGY 
 
 
During the 1980s, a French organization called Cinq-Demi developed a tool for analyzing conditions 
and the operational system faults underlying incidents or accidents (Lecomte et al. 1992, Wanner 
1999).17 This methodology has been used successfully to analyze accidents in a variety of domains, 
and on selected accident-inducing events reproduced in a flight simulator. In 1992, personnel of 
NASA-FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Office became interested in evaluating the 
potential application of this method to the ASRS database to aid identification of aviation system 
deficiencies. Representatives of the ASRS initiated discussions with ONERA and with Cinq-Demi 
about collaborating on an evaluation of the methodology. 
 
In 1995, NASA and ONERA agreed to a new task titled “Human Factors in Aeronautical Operations 
and Incidents” under the existing ONERA-NASA Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for 
collaborative research in aeronautics. The intent of this task was to evaluate the applicability of the 
Cinq-Demi methodology to the ASRS incident database. Consequently, the Cinq-Demi method was 
tested and was found to agree closely with the opinion of ASRS analysts in identifying incident 
causal factors in a sample set of about 300 ASRS reports. 
 
The underlying concept of the Cinq-Demi methodology is best understood from the perception of 
aviation safety depicted in figure B-1. The status space of figure B-1 is an N-dimensional space 
representing all the parameters that define the state of the system. The “Status Point” defines the 
state of the world from the perspective of the aircraft. The operational objective is to maintain the 
Status Point within the “Authorized Flight Envelope” where the probability of an accident is very 
low (say, 10-7). Outside the Authorized Flight Envelope is the “Peripheral Envelope” where the 
probability of an accident is somewhat higher (say, 10-3). A trespass into the Peripheral Envelope is 
an incident. In such cases, the task of the operator is to bring the aircraft back from the Peripheral 
Envelope to the Authorized Envelope. When the trespass exceeds the Peripheral Envelope, the 
consequence is a highly probable accident. 
 
                                                 
17
 There are substantial similarities between the Cinq-Demi methodology and the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell and Wiegmann 1997, Wiegman and Shappell 2001) that has become well 
known in the US.  
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 Status Point
Operational Margin
Authorized Envelope
Peripheral Envelope
(incidents)
High Probability 
of Accident
Accident 
Probability 
10 -3 
10 -7 
 
Figure B-1. A view on accident prevention. 
 
There are only three types of activities that can influence the movement of the Status Point, and 
these are represented in the first three grids of Cinq-Demi’s structured methodology for analysis. 
One such type of activity is associated with “Maneuverability,” represented in a Cinq-Demi coding 
grid called the “Grid of Aircraft Maneuver Events (GAME)” (fig. B-2). The GAME grid lists the 
maneuvers that are either imposed by the mission, or required for correction of the Status Point to 
accommodate environmental events. 
 
MANEUVERABILITY 
Maneuvers imposed by the mission  
Speed or Mach Number changes Mmm 
Flightpath angle changes (particularly flare) Mmp 
Heading changes (turn entry, turn, turn exit) Mmc 
Altitudes changes (climb or descent entry, climb or descent, level off) Mmh 
Configuration changes (Landing gear, flaps, airbrakes, systems on/off) Mms 
Correction maneuvers 
Speed or Mach Number correction Mcm 
Angle of attack or Longitudinal Attitude correction Mci 
Sideslip angle correction Mcd 
Lateral Attitude correction Mca 
Heading correction Mcc 
Altitude correction Mch 
Figure B-2. Grid of aircraft maneuver events (GAME). 
 
The second type of activity is “Sensitivity to Disturbances,” represented by the “Grid of Aircraft 
Sensitivity to Perturbations (GASP).” (See fig. B-3.) The GASP lists perturbation events that are due 
to internal disturbances (such as a system failure), or external disturbances (such as turbulence or a 
sudden change of runway status) that result in movement of the Status Point.  
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 SENSITIVITY TO PERTURBATIONS 
External Disturbances 
Gust Sraf 
Wind Gradient Sgrv 
Turbulence Stur 
Thunderbolt Sfdr 
Icing Sgiv 
Hail Sgrl 
Runway (Rapid change of status: holes, patches of snow…) Spst 
Bird Soix 
Internal Disturbances 
System Failure Span 
Fire Sfeu 
Cabin pressure loss Sprs 
Disturbance due to passenger Spax 
Figure B-3. Grid of aircraft sensitivity to perturbations (GASP). 
 
The third type of activity is “Pilotability,” represented by the “Grid of Operator Failures (GOOF).” 
(See fig. B-4.) In performing a task, an operator can miss or badly execute an elementary operation. 
GOOF identifies the “Elementary Operations” and the “Error Factors,” i.e., the conditions leading to 
that error. The Elementary Operations are Data Collection, Data Treatment and Decision, Data 
Transmission, and Action. There are five Error Factors: High Workload, Lack of Informational 
Cues, Misrepresentation due to wrong use of information and cues, Misrepresentation due to 
“diabolic” error, and Clumsiness.  
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GOOF ELEMENTARY OPERATIONS 
ERROR 
FACTORS 
Data Collection 
 
Machine⇒Man or 
Man⇒Man 
*s 
Decision after Data 
Treatment 
(Diagnostic) 
 
*d 
Data Transmission 
Man⇒Machine or 
Man⇒Man 
 
*t 
Action 
 
 
 
*a 
High Workload 
 
 
 
 
C* 
Saturation : Data not 
collected or wrongly 
captured. 
 
 
Cs 
Null, partial or wrong 
data treatment (diag-
nostic) leading to a bad 
decision. Too fast or too 
late decision. 
Cd
Saturation : 
Transmission 
inexistent, 
incomplete or 
wrong. 
Ct 
Saturation : No 
action or erroneous 
action on a control. 
 
 
Ca
Lack of cues 
(Under vigilance, 
very low 
workload) 
 
A* 
Lack of vigilance : 
Data not collected or 
wrongly captured. 
 
 
As 
Null, partial or wrong 
data treatment 
(diagnostic) leading to a 
bad decision. Too late 
decision. 
Ad
Lack of vigilance : 
Transmission 
inexistent, 
incomplete or 
wrong. 
At 
Lack of vigilance : 
No action or 
erroneous action on 
a control. 
 
Aa
Misrepresen-
tation 
(Model error, 
Wrong use of 
Data) 
 
M* 
Use of a wrong data 
collection model 
(localization, 
identification or 
transposition model). 
 
Ms 
Use of a wrong working 
or risk model : false, 
oversimplified or too 
complex. 
 
 
Md
Use of a wrong 
transmission model 
(localization, 
identification, way 
of action, 
addressee). 
Mt 
Use of a wrong 
controls model 
(localization, 
identification, way 
of action, status…) 
 
Ma
Misrepresen-
tation 
(A priori model 
"diabolic" error) 
P* 
Data collection 
limited to those 
which corroborate the 
a priori model. 
P 
Changes of situation 
denied or forgotten. No 
risk awareness. 
 
Pd
Change of 
transmission status 
denied or forgotten. 
 
Pt 
Action based on the 
a priori model. 
 
 
Pa
Clumsiness 
 
 
 
L* 
Wrong data 
collection by visual 
or auditory lapse. 
 
Ls 
Misunderstanding 
during data treatment. 
 
 
Ld
Wrong transmission 
by slip of the 
tongue. 
 
Lt 
Erroneous action 
due to an incorrect 
motion of a hand, a 
foot, a finger… 
La
Figure B-4. Grid of operator failures (GOOF). 
 
To describe an incident or an accident using the Cinq-Demi process, the analyst of a reported 
incident must first list, in chronological order, the sequence of sub-events as reported and then, for 
each sub-event, identify and code the three types of reported activities that can move the Status 
Point, by making the appropriate selections from the GAME, GASP, and GOOF grids. 
Cinq-Demi points out that other factors related to the operator’s physical and psycho-sociological 
behavior can be conducive to human error, but these cannot be resolved through operational or 
technical solutions. Factors such as these must be taken into account only to estimate the probability 
of occurrence of the same situation. They are accounted for in the fourth grid, called the “Grid of 
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Amplifiers of Risk of Errors (GARE).” (See fig. B-5.) The GARE grid is used to identify the human 
environment at the time of the incident. It includes physical factors, physiological factors, 
psychological factors, and sociological factors. 
 
GARE – Grid of Amplifiers of Risk of Errors 
Reduced Comfort – Seats, abnormal body position … 
Embarrassing 
working suit 
– Safety suit, gloves, boots, spectacles, 
mask, earphones,… 
Work station 
motion 
– Vibrations, shakes, low frequency 
oscillations (air sickness), work under load 
factor… 
Environment – Temperature (High or Low), cabin 
pressure, humidity, lighting (too low or too 
high), noise, smell… 
External Factors 
  
Pke 
Time at incident 
occurrence 
– Mission beginning or end, just back from 
holiday or just before holiday, during 
holiday, schedule changes… 
Physical Factors  
 
Pk 
Internal Factors  
Pki 
Medicines 
Alcohol 
Drugs 
 
Fatigue 
Needs – Hunger, thirst, natural needs… 
Physiological 
Factors  
  
Pg 
 
Pathological status – Sickness, flu, aches (head, teeth, ears…), 
itching, incapacitation (faint, death) 
Psychological 
Factors  
 
Ps 
 Fear, Anguish 
Personal troubles 
Family troubles, 
Memory loss, madness… 
Internal Factors 
 
Si 
Crew or team structure 
Crew member’s qualification 
Occasional manpower shortage 
Learner, beginner… 
Team internal dispute… 
Sociological 
Factors 
  
S 
External Factors  
Se 
Bad social environment (strike…) 
Visitor, Instructor, Inspector VIP… on board 
Figure B-5. Grid of amplifiers of risk of errors (GARE). 
 
The matrix of Operational System Faults and Elementary Operations constitutes the fifth and final 
coding grid that is called the “Rapid Analysis Fault Table (RAFT).” (See fig. B-6.) Cinq-Demi 
presumes that the error factors identified in the GOOF grid have their roots in systemic faults. The 
RAFT grid is meant to help to analyze these system faults of an incident, and to categorize them 
relative to the following concepts: 
• Organization (crew roles, responsibilities, tasks, and procedures) 
• Design (basic design concept rather than interface) 
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• Design Interface-Mechanical ergonomic (interface design for operation) 
• Design Interface-Mental ergonomic (interface design and interpretation) 
• Education-Training Basic 
• Education-Training Specific (systems, model, and proficiency) 
• Documentation (physical faults) 
• Documentation (wrong content) 
• Requirements (company, regulatory, and equipment manufacturer) 
 
Within the computerized version of the grids for GOOF and RAFT, there are illustrative examples 
and definitions available at each “cell” within these matrices (accessible by a double-click of the 
mouse on the cell) to aid the analyst in deciding on the appropriate categorization for an event.  
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RAFT ELEMENTARY OPERATIONS 
 
OPERATIONAL 
SYSTEM FAULT 
Data Collection 
Machine⇒Man or 
Man⇒Man 
*s 
Data Treatment 
(Diagnostic) 
Decision 
*d 
Data 
Transmission 
 
*t 
Action 
 
 
*a 
ORGANIZATION 
Who has to do ? 
Responsibility 
 
Or 
ORGANIZATION 
What to do ? 
Carrying out  
 
Oe 
ORGANIZATION 
With what to do ? 
Means  
 
Om 
O
RG
A
N
IZ
A
TI
O
N
 
O
**
 
ORGANIZATION 
How to do ? 
Drills Op* 
 
Ops 
 
Opd 
 
Opt 
 
Opa 
INTERFACES 
Mechanical ergonomy  
Hm* 
 
Hms 
 
Hmd 
 
Hmt 
 
Hma 
IN
TE
RF
A
CE
S 
H
**
 
INTERFACES 
"Mental" ergonomic 
Hc* 
 
Hcs 
 
Hcd 
 
Hct 
 
Hca 
EDUCATION-
TRAINING 
Basic education Fb 
 
Fb 
ED
U
CA
TI
O
N
 
F*
* 
EDUCATION-
TRAINING 
Specific educ. Fs* 
 
Fss 
 
Fsd 
 
Fst 
 
Fsa 
DOCUMENTATION 
Physical faults  
 
 Dm 
 
Dm 
D
O
CU
M
EN
TA
-
TI
O
N
   
D
**
 
DOCUMENTATION 
Wrong content  
 Dc* 
 
Dcs 
 
Dcd 
 
Dct 
 
Dca 
 REQUIREMENTS 
 R* 
 
Rs 
 
Rd 
 
Rt 
 
Ra 
Figure B-6. Rapid analysis fault table (RAFT). 
 
55 
APPENDIX C: TAXONOMIC STRUCTURE FOR CODIFICATION 
 
 
In the example presented in Section 3.2 (see fig. 2), states and events have been described in an 
informal way by sentences or words extracted from the narrative. Choosing the particular set of 
parameters that describe each state of the world, and the particular set of parameters that describe 
each transition, will give us a more formal description of each part of the Scenario of such an 
incident. 
 
A wide range of taxonomic structures18 is used in the various accident/incident databases. These 
structures often contain parts related to the description of the flight circumstances, and others that 
relate to the human factors of an event. As an example, O’Leary et al. (2002) gives a flavor of the 
type of parameters used in the British Airways Safety Information System (BASIS), while 
Murayama and Yamazaki (2002) show some of the Performance Shaping Factors used in a marine 
incident reporting system. The basis of our study relies on a consolidation of the three taxonomic 
structures that underlie three codifications19 that were designed specifically for use with ASRS 
reports: 
• The ASRS codification is a structured set of ‘descriptors’ that is currently used to describe 
the incident and store it in the database. The codification is designed for use by operational 
personnel. It is limited, primarily, by the size of the current paper-reporting form that the 
ASRS Office uses for the sake of maintaining confidentiality. After 28 years of operation, 
well over 100,000 ASRS incident reports have been codified with this taxonomic structure 
and are available in the ASRS database. 
• The X-Form is another template that has been designed for the codification of ASRS reports. 
It contains additional descriptors that are intended to address human-factors issues that had 
not been considered in the design of the original ASRS codification, but have since become 
of high interest. The X-Form has never been implemented for routine operation in the ASRS. 
• The Cinq-Demi methodology (described in Appendix B) was developed during the 1980s as 
a tool for analyzing aeronautical-incident reports from a human-factors point of view. This 
methodology focuses on identifying conditions that have a high probability of leading to 
human errors. In 1997, a codification form was designed, built upon the ASRS codification, 
but with additional fields to make the codification more compatible for efficient search and 
analysis using the Cinq-Demi methodology. Small sets of ASRS reports have been codified 
using this tool and are available. 
 
As highlighted in Wiegmann and von Thaden (2003), most incident reports are highly informative 
about what happened but give much less definitive information about why an incident happened. In 
a first-level filtering of a clustering process, we need to be able to cluster incident reports reliably on 
the basis of similarities of what happened. Our assumption is that this step can be achieved by the 
use of the taxonomic structure. 
                                                 
18
 By taxonomic structure we mean a set of structured terms that describes some domain or topic as in Swartout et al. 
(1997). The idea is that a taxonomic structure provides a skeletal structure for a knowledge base. 
19
 Codification refers specifically to the attributes and their values that constitute the fixed fields of the reporting form. 
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Therefore, our first objective was to identify all the possible terms of the taxonomy and their 
structure for the incident reports in our world of aviation. Each term will map to a parameter in the 
description of our world in the incident model (described in Section 3). Moreover, for every 
parameter used, we can state whether the concept captured is objective or not. We will call a concept 
objective if it can be defined on the basis of observable data. All the concepts that are not objective 
are called subjective. 
 
Our hypothesis is that a “full and complete” set of objective parameters adequately describes the 
what and could be incorporated into the fixed fields of a well-designed computerized reporting form 
for electronic submission. Then the first step of the clustering process (on similarities of the what) 
could be totally automated. The understanding of the why will rely on subjective parameters and on 
exploitation of the free text. 
 
In Appendix D, we will discuss the merger of all the parameters identified in the three codifications, 
and we will assume that the result constitutes a “full and complete” set of parameters for the 
description of any and all aviation incidents in our world. However, as these three codification 
schemes entail structured sets of descriptors, we will, in this appendix, first compare these 
codifications at the highest levels of their structures. 
 
C-1. High-Level Structure of the Three Codifications 
 
In this section, we are going to study separately the taxonomic structures of the three codification 
forms for the ASRS reports. We will classify the type of information contained in the main sections 
of the three forms into the following five categories as the highest level of their structures: 
1. Time and Setting: We group in this category all the information related to the frame of the story 
(when, where…) and to the fixed entities (facilities, equipment…).  
2. Cast of entities: This category contains information on the persons and all the entities that 
evolve and take action in order to create the story.  
3. Anomaly: This pertains to all the information that explains why the “anomalous state” is 
anomalous. 
4. Transitions: This is all the information that characterizes a transition in the State/Transition 
model. 
5. Other: This includes any information that cannot be classified in any of the other four 
categories. 
 
The main purpose of these five categories is to better understand the main similarities and 
differences among the three codifications in their structures and their relations to the State/Transition 
model. Some sections of a codification form may address several categories, and then we will go one 
step down into the knowledge structure to understand their differences. 
 
For each codification form, we are also going to highlight the codified links between the main 
sections of their structures. Our focus in this study on the high-level structure and linkages will, of 
course, not reveal the relations between pieces of information at lower levels in the taxonomic 
structure. 
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C-1.1  ASRS Codification 
The ASRS fields are organized into the following nine main sections: 
1. Time: The time section gives the date, the day, and the local time of day for incident occurrence. 
The local time is given only as a six-hour time interval, and we can assume for almost all 
incidents that the entire story occurs during this interval of time. This section of the ASRS 
codification is part of our “Time and Setting” category. 
2. Place: The place section contains 4 subsections (Locale Reference, State Reference, Relative 
Position, and Altitude). We can assume that the entire story is linked to the same State Reference 
and Local Reference. However, the Relative Position and the Altitude subsections describe a 
very precise point of the space, and that point is identified with the anomalous state reached 
during the story. This section is in the “Time and Setting” category. 
3. Environment: This section describes the weather, light, visibility, ceiling, and runway visual 
range (RVR) and falls in the “Time and Setting” category. In the spirit of the ASRS codification, 
the environment section relates to the weather conditions that are generally presumed not to 
change during the course of events of the reported incident. Nevertheless, some incident reports 
describe a rapid deterioration of the weather conditions, and in such cases these parameters could 
vary. 
4. Aircraft: Aircraft are, of course, central elements in an aviation incident. Their descriptive 
parameters evolve with time, and the incident report often describes their different states. We 
point out that their description in the ASRS codification contains fields that are not intrinsic 
characteristics of the aircraft but are linked with other “elements” of the story (e.g., Controlling 
Facilities, Coordinating Facilities, etc.). These elements will be studied in section C-2. For the 
most part, an aircraft is considered as an entity in the ASRS codification, and therefore this 
section falls within the “Cast of entities” category. 
5. Component: A component is one part of an aircraft. The link between the component and the 
aircraft is well codified in the ASRS form. The ASRS form puts the component in a separate 
section for historical reasons. For the purpose of this discussion, we consider the component as a 
part of the related aircraft entity. This section falls into the “Cast of entities” category.  
6. Person: People are the other essential entities of the story. This section also falls in the “Cast of 
entities” category. Some of the subsections of the ASRS form are used to link the described 
person to other entities (e.g., aircraft). 
7. Events: The events section describes several things, including the anomalous state(s) 
encountered in the story and the following actions that resulted in recovery to a safe state. 
Consequently, some of the subsections of the ASRS “Events” are in the “Anomaly” category, 
others are in the “Transitions” category, while some belong to the “Other” category. 
8. Maintenance Factors: The maintenance factors section is dedicated to incidents occurring 
during maintenance operations. It is not within the scope of this study, and this section is omitted 
from further consideration. 
9. Assessments: The assessments section is mainly an expert’s judgment about the main factors 
that caused this world to reach the anomalous state. It emphasizes some parts of the other fields 
used to describe the story (e.g., an aircraft, a person, an environment factor, etc.). It is a 
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judgment about the importance of some particular part of the description and so falls in the fifth 
category for purposes of this discussion. 
 
Figure C-1 shows the contributions of these sections of the ASRS codification form to the categories 
of the information matrix and to the descriptions of the components of the Incident Model. 
 
 
Time
. . . . . .
State 0 State 1 State n-1 State n
Transition  
0
Transition 
1
Transition 
n-2
Transition 
n-1
Person
Aircraft/Component
Environment
Time
Place (State Ref, Locale Ref)
Place (Rel. Pos., Altitude)
Event (Anomaly)
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Figure C-1. The categories of information, the sections of the ASRS form, and the incident model. 
 
As already mentioned, some links between parts of knowledge are explicitly codified in the ASRS 
form. Others are only implicit. Figure C-2 shows the links that are both explicit and completely 
defined in the ASRS form. 
 
 Person 
Aircraft 
Component 
Possible
Required
 
Figure C-2. Explicit links in the ASRS form. 
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Other more or less implicit links also exist in the ASRS database. We can point out three types of 
such links: 
• Links between parameters describing the anomaly and one or several entities in order to 
describe an anomalous state (for example, an anomalous state described by “Ground 
Incursion” should be linked to an aircraft). These links are often implicit. 
• Links between an event and one or several entities. For example, the Resolutory Action 
“Diverted to Alternate” is associated with the Flight Crew in the ASRS codification (because 
“Diverted to Alternate” is an entry in the “Flight Crew” subsection). Nevertheless the link 
between the event and the entity is only partly explicit as the story might contain several 
flight crews. 
• Links between entities and other entities that are “not well defined.” For example, the sub-
section, “Controlling Facilities,” links the aircraft with something (tower, TRACON…) that 
is not clearly codified in the ASRS form (there are no descriptors for the tower, 
TRACON…). 
 
C-1.2 The X-Form 
The X-Form is another template that has been developed for the codification of ASRS reports. It was 
designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of the ASRS form that had been identified after 
several years of use. The X-Form has never been implemented at ASRS. The definition of the 
required or possible links between the main sections, and how these links are codified, is not always 
clear. 
 
The X-Form is organized into the following 18 sections: 
1. Record Control: This groups information that enables good management of the database 
(accession number, type of codification, etc.). This section is not directly related to the 
description of the story and falls in the “Other” category. 
2. Time: “Time and Settings” category. 
3. Place: This is similar to the Place section in the ASRS Form. It is a part of the “Time and 
Setting” category. It contains both a general description of the location and a precise description 
of the place of the anomalous state. 
4. Environment: This section describes the weather, visibility, terrain, etc., and is part of the 
“Time and Settings” category.  
5. Traffic: This describes the overall air/ground traffic at the time of the story. It is part of the 
“Time and Settings” category. 
6. Airspace: This describes the Airspace involved in the story. Therefore, at least one aircraft 
should be linked to each airspace that is involved, and each aircraft involved should be linked to 
at least one airspace. The notion of Airspace is similar to the notion of Place (it is a division of 
the space) and falls in the “Time and Settings” category.  
7. Facility-Arpt: An airport is a fixed entity (as is the “Ground” in the Cinq-Demi codification) 
and so is part of the “Time and Setting” category.  
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8. Facility-NAVAID: As for the airport, it is a fixed entity and a part of the “Time and Setting” 
category. 
9. Facility-ATC: As for the airport and the NAVAID, it is a fixed entity and a part of the “Time 
and Setting” category. 
10. Aircraft: Falls in the “Cast of Entities” category. It contains both static and dynamic parameters. 
11. Person: The person section falls in the “Cast of Entities” category, but the HUMPERF (Human 
Performance) subsection of Person describes actions made by the person. So the HUMPERF 
subsection is part of the “Transitions” category. 
12. Info-Probs: This section describes events linked to a communication problem. This specific type 
of event has been added in the X-Form as it seems to entail crucial steps leading to an anomalous 
state. These events are always linked to at least one person. It falls in the “Transitions” category. 
13. Conflict: This section describes the anomalous state and so is part of the “Anomaly” category. 
14. Adverse Interaction: This section contains three parts: Interpersonal, Proximity, and 
Coordination. The second one, Proximity, characterizes the proximity of the airspace to an 
airport and can be considered as part of the “Time and Settings” category. The two other parts 
describe adverse interactions between persons or a coordination failure. They are more related to 
the description of the sequence of events and are classified in the “Other” category. 
15. Event Flow: This section describes both the anomalous state (“Anomaly” category) and the 
following events (“Transition” category). 
16. Situation: This section is codified only for reports related to a recurrent event or to a situation 
(the “same” situation has already been encountered several times in the last months). Its aim is to 
identify a “latent fault” in the system (policy, procedure, etc.) and is a little like some elements 
of the RAFT in the Cinq-Demi codification. It falls in the “Other” category. 
17. ATC: This section contains two parts. The first one, ATC-HANDLING, describes actions taken 
by the ATC and is part of the “Transition” category. The other one, AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT, 
mixes anomalous state descriptions (e.g., NMAC) and judgments about the role of the persons 
(PLT-DEV, INTERCOORD…). We are going to put this second subsection in the “Other” 
category (partly because, in the ASRS form, the Air Traffic Incident subsection was in the 
ASSESSMENTS section.). 
18. General Assessment: This is a judgment about the importance of some factors already codified 
and so falls in the “Other” category. 
 
Figure C-3 shows the relationships of the sections of the X-Form to the categories of information 
and to the descriptions of the Incident Model. 
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Figure C-3. The categories of information, the X-Form sections, and the incident model. 
 
Even if the links between the sections of the X-Form are not always clearly codified, we should have 
at least the ones shown in figure C-4. 
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Info-Probs 
 
Figure C-4. The links between the sections of the X-Form. 
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There are other links included in the codification as, for instance, between the Info-Probs section and 
other sections; this is because a communication problem can entail an equipment problem. We will 
discuss later how to represent the elements of the “Transition” category in order to retain all the 
necessary links. 
 
C-1.3 Cinq-Demi Codification 
A description of the Cinq-Demi methodology is presented in Appendix B, and the structure of the 
Cinq-Demi codification designed for use on ASRS reports has already been extensively reviewed in 
previous studies (Maille 2001a and 2001b). The Cinq-Demi codification contains mainly three sorts 
of information: the description of the frame of the story (“Time and Settings” category), the 
description of the entities (“Cast of Entities” category) and the descriptions of events related to the 
persons (“Transitions” category). The Cinq-Demi codification primarily relies on two types of 
entities: aircraft and person. Their possible links are well identified and formalized. The “Ground” 
environment is highlighted in the Cinq-Demi formal codification, and some equipment problems can 
be linked to it. The “Ground” refers to the airport facilities and equipment and so we consider it to 
be part of the “Time and Setting” category. 
 
Cinq-Demi’s field called “Theme” is sometimes an “Anomaly” description and sometimes a 
“Transition” description. The confusion over the meaning of this field was, in fact, the origin of the 
discussions that led to the scenario concept described in this report, and so it will not be considered 
further. 
 
Figure C-5 shows the relationships of the sections of the Cinq-Demi codification to the categories of 
information and to the description of the Incident Model. 
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Figure C-5. The categories of information, the sections of the Cinq-Demi codification, 
and the incident model. 
 
An important difference between the ASRS and the Cinq-Demi codifications is that the persons 
encoded are not exactly the same. The Cinq-Demi codification identifies only the categories of 
persons involved in an error rather than the individuals. 
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C-2. Comparison of the Three Structures 
 
Each one of the three structures has some special characteristics, but their high-level organizations 
are quite similar. We must keep in mind that these forms are used to codify the report primarily for 
efficient retrospective search of the database and not as the sole basis of an in-depth analysis of the 
incident. That is why they include neither a precise description of the sequence of transitions, nor an 
accurate time reference of events or states. We are now going to describe the differences among the 
three forms for each category of information, and we will define the taxonomic structure that seems 
to be the most relevant for purposes of our study. Our objective is to define a taxonomic structure 
that supports both efficient retrospective search and the in-depth analyses that are the subject of this 
report. The sections used in the ASRS codification are all included in the X-Form’s sections. The 
Cinq-Demi codification introduces two new sections (GOOF and RAFT) for the description of the 
transitions. 
• “Cast of entities”: The three codifications do not entail exactly the same entities, but all three 
refer to the notions of Person and Aircraft. 
− Person: The Cinq-Demi codification highlights only groups of persons that have made 
some error, and their codification is designed for understanding conditions that lead to 
human error. As the ASRS reports are primarily used for an operational analysis of 
incidents, it is certainly better to encode all the persons involved in the incident. 
Nevertheless, we will have to be sure that our codification allows us to identify which 
persons have made an error. (The links between the fields used to describe the error or 
the conditions leading to the error, and the person or team responsible for the error, must 
be clearly codified.) 
− Aircraft: The only difference among the three forms is that the ASRS codification has a 
separate section for the description of an aircraft component. We point out that the 
information related to the component is often more related to a description of an event 
(malfunctioning, failed, improperly operated…) than it is to a description of the aircraft. 
As we want to highlight the transitions (the why and the how), we propose to group such 
information with the other transitions (as in the Cinq-Demi grids where the Technical 
Failure (Span) is classified as one of the possible perturbations). 
• “Time and Setting”: The most complete description is the one used in the X-Form. We are 
going to use the sections of the X-Form as a starting point for this category. 
• “Transitions”: In our analysis of the three forms, we put the information related to the 
“Transitions” (at least the one involving a person) in a separate category, but in the templates 
that information can be: 
− incorporated in another section (for instance HUMPERF is a subsection of the PERSON 
section), or 
− in a specific section (e.g., INFO-PROB section). 
Incorporating the transition information into another section enables us to relate it to the 
other information of that section. This is used to highlight two sorts of links: 
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− The link between the transition and the person responsible for that transition (for instance 
HUMPERF subsection). Thus the actor performing the action is unambiguously 
identified. 
− The link between the transition and a specific state. (For instance, the “Resolutory Event” 
subsection of the ASRS form is in the same section as the “Anomaly” and the 
“Independent Detector” subsections, highlighting their link.) 
Incorporating the transition information within a person description raises two problems: 
− It does not allow a good codification of an event linked to several persons (such as 
communication problems). 
− It does not allow an easy representation of the sequence between the events (even if we 
do not know yet whether we really want to codify such a sequence in a codification 
process) or an easy retrieval of how things happened. 
 
As we assume that a “good” schemata that captures the essence of the story of the incident is that of 
the Scenario (i.e., Context + Behavior ! Outcome), we propose to clearly separate in the taxonomic 
structure all the information related to the transitions and, therefore, to Behavior. The “Resolutory 
Action/Event” must be identified separately (as it is done in the X-Form and in the ASRS form) 
because it is not part of the “Behavior” of our Scenario. For our current study, the Outcome of the 
Scenario is an anomalous state and the Behavior of recovery to a safe state is not a part of this study. 
The Scenario that includes consideration of recovery from an anomalous to a safe state will be the 
subject of a subsequent study. 
•  “Anomaly”: This is described in a very similar way in the ASRS and in the X-Form. The 
two descriptions will be merged for our structure.  
• “Other”: Having a separate section for record control seems to be a good idea. The other 
sections (e.g., Assessments, Situation) have to be consolidated depending on the aim of our 
codification. 
 
The overall taxonomic structure of the knowledge and its links with the three parts of the Scenario 
are shown on figure C-6. 
 
C-3. A Full and Complete Set of Parameters 
 
In section C-2, we compared, at a high level, the taxonomic structures that underlie the three 
codification forms specifically designed for ASRS reports. We showed that the structure of the 
knowledge used in the ASRS codification is embodied in the one used by the X-Form. Therefore, we 
will use the X-Form structure on which to map all the parameters used in all three forms. Parameters 
that are addressed only in the Cinq-Demi form will be inserted at the most relevant place in that 
structure. 
 
The set of all the parameters of this taxonomic structure is given in Appendix D. 
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Figure C-6. Main relations between the Scenario and the categories of information. 
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APPENDIX D: MAPPING PARAMETERS TO A “FULL AND 
COMPLETE” SET 
 
 
This appendix describes the process of formulating a “full and complete” set of parameters based on 
a consolidation of those that have been identified in (1) the current ASRS codification form, (2) the 
Cinq-Demi GRIDS, and (3) the “X-Form.” All of these parameters have been classified according to 
the five categories of information (Time and Setting, Entities, Anomaly, Transitions, and Other) and 
their sub-categories as shown in figure 6. A separate table of parameters is built for each sub-
category. 
 
Moreover, this set of factors has been separated into the following two categories: 
1. Factors that are clearly and unarguably objective, categorical, and measurable (for simplicity, 
these will be called “objective” factors in this presentation). 
2. All the others (that, for the moment at least, we will simply label as “subjective”). 
 
We need not seek “perfection” in this process of classifying parameters as objective or subjective. 
Certainly, there are factors that everyone would put in category 1 that could have an aspect of 
subjectivity (such as visibility, for example). Certainly, there will be differences of opinion on where 
to assign some factor, but we do not consider this degree of uncertainty to be very important to the 
result because the number of questionable factors constitutes only a small portion of the total 
number of parameters. 
 
In each of the following tables, the titles of the tables should not to be confused with the fields. The 
fields (or the attributes) associated with each title are in yellow cells. The parametric values of these 
attributes are shown in white cells if they are objective parameters or in green cells if they are other 
than objective (called subjective) factors. 
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Time and Setting 
Date of Occurrence
Day of Occurrence
S UN
M ON
TUE
W E D
THU
FRI
S AT
Tim e of Occurrence
0001 to 0600
0601 to 1200
1201 to 1800
1801 to 2400
Tim e
 
State Ref.
Local Ref.
Fac ility
ID
Type
ARPT
VOR
VORTAC
NDB
TACAN
Intersec tion
Spec ial Use A irspace
Relative Pos it ion
Dis tance
Radial
Angle
A ltitude  
M S L
AGL
Place
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Flight Conditions Lighting
VMC Dawn
IMC Daylight
Mixed Dusk
Special VFR Night
Marginal Visibility in Statute Miles
Ceiling Low Boundary (statute miles)
CLR Upper Boundary (statute miles)
Single Value (feet) Single Value (statute miles)
Lower Boundary (feet) Runway Visual Range
Upper Boundary (feet) Lower Boundary (feet)
WX-AVD Upper Boundary (feet)
Weather Elements Single Value (feet)
Wind Fx Terrain Fx
CLR-TURB MTNS
WAKE HILL
TURB RISING
ALOFT DITCH
SHEAR TREE
HEAD WIRE
TAIL TOWER
CROSS OTH-OBST
TSTORM WATER
DN-DRAFT GRADE
UP-DRAFT CRANE
Obscur'n Fx BRIDGE
SMOG BUILDING
PRECIP VEHICLE
DUST OBS-LTG
CLOUDS Other Fx
SUNPOS BIRDS
UNDCAST ANIMAL
OVERCAST PED
HAZE LTNG
OBSTRUC LITE
FOG SIGN
WDW MARK
Precip'n Fx ENGICE
RAIN FRAMICE
TSTORM FOB
DRIZZLE SKYDIVER
SLEET BARO-GRADIENT
SNOW WXBAL
HAIL RAPID-DETER
JETBLAST
Environment
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Involvement
SURF
O&D
COM
PROB
Facility State
Facility ID
Facility Descriptors
PVT
CTL
UCTL
CLOSED
SATELLITE
CONSTRUCTN-ACTIVITY
RWYS-IN-USE-PAR
RWYS-IN-USE-INTER
RWYS-IN-USE-CVG
RWYS-IN-USE-DVG
RWY-CHG-IN-PROGRESS
CRASH-ACTIVATED
HELIPORT
SEAPLANE
Problem Components & Services
RWY
TXWY
RAMP
SURFACE
WX-EQP
COM-EQP
COM-ENV
INTXN-NAME
DMEN
SRVCS
PROC-POL
STAFF
MGMT
Facility Airport
 
Involvm ent
CTRL
NBRQ
COM
PROB
Fac ility  Type
TW R
TRACON
ARTCC
M ILFAC
FSS
CPNY-RDO
CTAF
UNICOM
Fac ility  S tate
Fac ility  ID
Fac ility  Descriptors
DARC-ACTIVATED
BUEC-ACTIVATED
TRNG-IN-PROG
CRASH-ACTIVATED
CLOSED
NON-RDR
NON-FED
Problem  Com ponents  &  Services
RADAR
COM -EQP
COM -ENV
OTH-EQP
COM PUTER
STRUCTURE
SRVCS
STAFF
PROC-POL
SCOPE
M GM T
Facility A TC
 
OPPDIR UNKVFR
SAMEDIR POPUP
SIDEBY UNAUTH
CONVERG PLTDEV
INTERSEC FLTASSIST
PARALLEL EMER
SAMEALT SPC-EVENT
OVERTAKE BOUNDARY
PERFDIFF TFC-SEQ
CONGEST CROSSING
FLYW AY FORMATION
OVERFLT FORM-BREAKUP
NORAC FORM-JOINUP
NORDO CLOSURE-RATE
Traffic
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 Involvement Routes (cont'd)
OCCU Arrival
SHUD Profile Descent
ENT Holding Pattern
EXIT STAR
PROB On Vectors
Airspace ID VFR
Type Approach
Class A Circling
Class B Contact
Class C Instrument Precision
Class D Instrument Non Precision
Class E SVFR
Class G Traffic Pattern
Special Use Visual
Temporary Use Charted Visual
SUA (Special Use Airspace) Straight-In
PROHIB Military
RESTR Transit
REFUEL OverW TR
W ARN IAPS
SR ILS
ALERT VOR
MOA NDB
VR MLS
IR PARALLEL
OSUA RNAV
DZ SDF
ROUTES TACAN
Departure Design Problem
SID MAP-PT
Noise Abatement INTXN-NAME
Other Published IFR Departure APCHES
On Vectors DEPS
Enroute CHARTING
Airway XING-ALT
Direct PROX
On Vectors HMDG
Atlantic
Pacific
Other Oceanic
Airspace
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Involvement
NAV-ERR
COM
PROB
Facility Type
ILS
VOR
VORTAC
NDB
TACAN
BCSTN
LDIN
ROT-BEAC
MLS
LORAN
SATELLITE
OMEGA
OTH-VIS
Facility State
Facility ID
Problem Components & Services
ILS
COM-EQP
COM-ENV
LITE
SRVCS
STRUCTURE
Facility NAVAID
 
Proximity Btwn Terminals & Airspc
Civil-Mil Arpt
Civil-Civil Arpt
Route-Terminal
Route-SUA
Bird Flyway-Terminal
Canadian Airspace
Mexican Airspace
Adverse Interactions
 
 
72 
Entities 
Make Model Advanced Ckpt
Aircraft Type DISPLAY
SMA NAVCTL
SMT NON
LTT Operator Organization
MDT Common Carrier
MLG Air Carrier
LGT Air Taxi
HVT Charter
W DB General Aviation
FGT Corporate
BMB Instructional
MLT Personal
MTR Other
SPC Government
ULT Military
SPN RNT
BAL Mission
HNG Passengers
OTH Freight
Crew Size Training
1 Pleasure
2 Agriculture
3 Ambulance
4OM Ferry
Airframe Test Flight
wings Tactical
W L Refueling
W M Traffic W atch
W H Other  
W B Banner Tow
W O Business
W R Photo-Shoot
gear Repositioning
LN Skydiving
LR EMS
LF CBO
surf mod CKD-RID
SL FLT-CHK
SS UTL
SA PRB
SI Flight Plan
engines VFR
ER IFR
ET DVFR
EJ SVFR
EN COM
Number of Engines NON
Aircraft
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Flt Phase Flt Phase (cont'd)
GND ARR
PREFLT DSCNT
PUSH-BK APCH 
POW ER-BK LNDG
TAXI HLD-SHT
GND-HOLD AIR-HOLD
HLD-SHT MNTN
INTXN-XING PATTERN
Parked GAR
Maintenance SHT-FLD
Holding OFF-ARPT
Position and Hold MAP-PT
Takeoff Roll PARK
DEP LOW
TKOF-POS TAG
TKOF INTXN-LNDG
ABORT DN-W IND
INTXN-TKOF SIDESTEP
ICLB Intermediate Altitude
CLB Vacating Altitude
DN-W IND Roll
SHT-FLD Missed Approach
OFF-ARPT Operating Under FAR Part
MITO Part 91
Intermediate Altitude Part 119
Vacating Altitude Part 121
CRS Part 125
W X-AVD Part 129
VECTOR Part 135
DIV Other Part
DIRECT Maneuver
Level Imposed by Mission
Holding Speed
Enroute Altitude Change Angle
MNV Heading
TURN Altitude
180 Configuration
360 Correction
AUTO-ROT Speed
LLL Angle Attack/Longi.
LLH Sideslip
TOW Lateral Attitude
OTH Heading
EMER Altitude
Aircraft (cont'd)
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Routes Approach
Departure CAT-I
SID CAT-II
Noise Abatement CAT-III
Other Published IFR Departure BC
On Vectors LDA
Enroute MLS
Airway PAR
Direct RNAV
On Vectors SDF
Atlantic TACAN
Pacific OHD
Other Oceanic OPPDIR
Arrival INIT
Profile Descent FINL
Holding Pattern SHT-FINL
STAR NON-RDR
On Vectors PRACTICE
VFR DN-W IND
Approach UP-W IND
Circling SIDESTEP
Contact Cabin Activity
Instrument Precision Beverage Service
Instrument Non Precision Boarding
SVFR Cart Service
Traffic Pattern Deplaning
Visual Meal Service
Charted Visual Movie
Straight-In Safety Related Duties
Military Seated
Transit Tray Service
OverW TR Other (activity)
Navigation in Use Cabin Lighting
ILS Bright
Localizer Only (RW Y ID) Medium
Localizer & Glideslope (RW Y ID) Dark
VOR Available Seats
NDB Pass. on Board
FMS or FMC Maintenance Status
GPS Required Documentation on Board
INS No
Loran Yes
Pilotage Released for Service
DME No
Descriptors Yes
FGN-FLAG Maintenance Deferred
FORMATION
ORDNANCE-ON-BOARD
Aircraft (cont'd)
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Problem Systems ATA Code
Placard/Marking Manufacturer
Servicing Problem
Air Conditioning Design Deficiency
Auto Flt Failed
Communications Improperly Operated
Electric Power Malfunctioning
Eqp/Furnishings Not Installed
Fire Protection Aircraft Problems
Flt Ctls CKPT-NOISE
Fuel MTNC-DISCREPANCY
Hydraulic Power DECOMPRESSION
Ice/Rain Protect FIRE
Indicating/Recording Sys ACFT-PERF
Landing Gear PREFLT-DEICING
Lighting ENG-OUT-PERF
Navigation (+ FMS) CONFIGN
Oxygen FLEET-INCONSIST
Pneumatic DESIGN
Vacuum CABIN-SPACE
W ater/W aste VIS-SIGNATURE
Electrical Panels & Parts INSPECTION
APU CREW -COMPLEMENT
Doors
Fuselage
Nacelles/Pylons
Stabilizers
W indows
W ings
Propeller
Rotor
Pwe Plant
Eng Fuel Ctl
Ignition
Air
Eng Ctls
Eng lng/W arning
Exhaust
Oil
Starting
Turbines
W ater Induction
Aircraft (cont'd)
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Person's Involvement Function at Tme of Occurrence (cont'd)
Pilot Flying Controller
Pilot Not Flying Local, Combined Local
Monitoring Local, Combined Local
Controlling Ground, Combined Ground
Cabin Service Ground, Combined Ground
Evaluating Flight Data
Instructing Clearance Delivery
Receiving Instruction Departure
Maintenance Approach
Observing Radar
Other Direct Involvement Combined Radar
Affiliation Non Radar
Government Handoff Position
FAA Traffic Management
Foreign Flow
Military Maintenance
Company Inspector
Air Carrier Technician
Air Taxi Lead Technician
Charter Flight Attendant
Corporate On Duty
Other Off Duty
Contracted Service Extra
Instructional MILFAC
Personal PAR
CGA RANGE
NGA RSU
UGA OTHER
Function at Time of Occurrence FSS Specialist
Oversight UNICOM Operator
PIC FBO Personnel
Supervisor Vehicle Driver
Coordinator Dispatcher
Flight Attendant in Charge Gate
Airport Manager Ramp Guidance
Observation CGP
Air Carrier Inspector CENR
Company Check Pilot Qualifications
Observer Pilot
Passenger Student
Instruction Private
Instructor Instruments
Trainee Multi-Engine
Flight Crew Commercial
Single Pilot ATP
Captain CFI
First Officer Flight Engineer
Second Officer Military
Relief Pilot
Navigator
Load Master
Person
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Qualifications (cont'd) Factors Adversely Affecting Perf.
Controller Physical Factors
Military External Factors
Radar Reduced Comfort
Non Radar W orkspace
Developmental Seats 
SPI Abnormal Body Position
Technician Under Hood
Repairman Embarrassing W orking Suit
Powerplant Safety Suit
Airframe Gloves
FCC Boots
Inspection Authority Earphones
Flight Attendant W ork Station Motion
Currently Qualified Vibration, Shakes
Trainee Low Freq. Oscillations
Aircraft Qualified on (number) Load Factor
Other Rate of Climb
FSS Specialist Rate of Descent
Dispatcher Environment
Experience Temperature
Controller Cabin Pressure
Radar Humidity
Non Radar Lighting
Supervisor Background Contrast
Military Audio Interferences
Limited Radar Noise 
Time Certified in Pos 1 Visual Interferences
Time Certified in Pos 2 Smell
General/Total Smoke
Dispatch Time at Incident Occurrence
FSS Specialist Mission Beginning
Flight Attendant Mission End
Total Back from Vacations
Airline Total Before Vacations
Type During Vacations
Maintenance Schedule Changes
Repairman Duty Cycle Length
Technician Shift-Chg
Lead Technician Internal
Avionics Medicines
Supervisor Alcohol
Flight Time Drugs
Total
Last 90 Days
In Acft Type
Person (cont'd)
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Factors Adversely Affecting Perf. (cont'd) Factors Adversely Affecting Perf. (cont'd)
Physiological Factors Sociological Factors (cont'd)
Fatigue External Factors
Needs Bad Social Environment (Strike)
Hunger, Thirst Visitor
Natural Needs (toilets) Instructor
Pathological Status Inspector
Sickness, Flu VIP
Aches CPNY-BUS
Itching Psychological Factors
Obvious Incapacitation Fear, Anguish
SUB Incapacitation Personal Troubles
Vertigo Personal Preoccupations
Hypoxia Family Troubles
Illusion Memory Loss
Yehudi Madness
Black-Hole TASKLOAD
W hite-Out SGL-PLT
Sloping-Ter COMBO-POS
Disorientation COMBO-SEC
Sociological Factors CREW -COMPLEMENT
Internal Factors PREOCC
Crew or Team Structure TFC
Qualification W X-AVD
Unqualified EQP-PROB
Not-Current TRNG-IN-PROG
Occasional Manpower Shortage FLTASSIST
Team Internal Dispute CHKLST
Proficiency TUNING
In-Doubt OTH-TASK
Learner, Beginner SPC-EVENT
Training Deficiency FUEL
Recency-of-Experience ATTITUDE
Language Barrier UNPROFESS
Familiarity ANTAGON
ARPT COMPLACENT
ATC-PROC GETHOME
EQP AGGRESS
AREA RSCE-DEFIC
TERRAIN CTLR
ACFT-PERF SUPVR
W X FLC
AIRSPACE CHART
REGS PUB
NAVAID FSS
ARPT-PROC NAVAID
CHART ACFT-EQP
NEW ATC-EQP
ATC-SRVC
OTH 
PAX-DISCOMFORT
PAX-ILLNESS
Person (cont'd)
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Anomaly 
Technical Loss of control
Acft Eqp Prob Ground Excursion
Critical Rwy Overrun
Less Severe Rwy Excursion
ATC Com (lost or intermittent) Txwy Excursion
False/Erratic Course Indic. Ramp (Gnd Excursion)
Fuel Other
Exhaustion Gnd Loop
Inadequate Stall
Contamination Spin
Type Hydroplane
Encounters Maintenance Problem
In-Flt Encounter Improper Maintenance
VFR in IMC Non Compliance with MEL
VFR over the TOP Improper Documentation
W eather Tkof
Turbulence Overweight Tkof
Birds Landing
FOB Overshot
Obstruc Undershot
Skydivers Gear Up Landing
W ake Turbulence Tailstrike
Gnd Encounter Hard Landing
FOB W rong Rwy
Ped W rong Arpt
Animal Landing W ithout Clr
Birds Txwy Lndg
Eqp Overweight Lndg
Jet Blast Apch
Vehicle W rong Rwy
Deviations W rong Arpt
Speed Dev Unstabilized Apch
Alt Dev Ground Incursion
Overshoot on Clb Taxi
Overshoot on Dscnt Runway
Undershoot on Clb Conflict
Undershoot on Dscnt Airborne
Excursion Clb NMAC
Excursion Dscnt Air Less Severe
Xing Restrict Not Met Ground
Acft at Imprud Alt Gnd Severe
Descent Below/MSA Gnd Less Severe
Other Spatial Deviation Airspace Violation
Track or Hdg Dev Unauth Incursion
Acft on Imprud Track Unauth Excursion
Control. Flt Toward Terrain Uncoord Penetration
Unctrl Arpt Tfc Pattern Dev Uncoord Exit
Altitude Heading Rule Deviation
Glideslope
Anomaly
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Non Adhere Legal Rqmt Cabin  Event
Clrnc Galley Fire
Pub Proc Passenger
MEL Misconduct
W x Mins Illness
FAR Contraband
Alt-Hdg Electronic Device
Alt-Setting Other
Ster Ckpt FLC Status
Speed Hazardous Cargo Problem
Inspec Smoke or Fire
AD Fumes
Company Policies CG Irregularity
Required Legal Separation Uncoord
Non Comp/Srvc Advsy Sector Penetration
Rwy Movement
Anomaly (cont'd)
 
 
Traffic Mix
ACFT
VEH
VSL
OTH
Flt Regime
GND
TMNL
ENRTE
Event Severity
MIN
MOD
NEAR
Miss Distance
Horizontal Miss
Vertical Miss
Diag/Unspect'd Miss
Conflict
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Transitions 
Data Collection/Transmission Decision after Treatment
COM PLAN
INTRA-CKPT PREFLT
INTER-CKPT INFLT
ATC-FLC TFC
CPNY-FLC APCH 
INTER-FAC BACKUP
INTRA-FAC TFC-SEQ
CKPT-CAB DECIDE-Y
GND-CKPT DEP
TECHNIQ TKOF
OBSERV ABORT
TFC RTN
SPACING AVD-W X
ALT GAR
HZ-POS DIVERT
ATT COMPLY
SPEED DEVIATE
W X TIMING
EQP-STAT EMER
MIS-ID LNDG
TECHNIQ MAP 
ARPT CROSS
LANDMARK HLD-SHT
RW Y MTN 
TXW Y CLIMB
INTXN DSCNT
W ALK-AROUND TURN
TGT AIRHLD
CHK-PT TKOF-POS
LOST-SIGHT EXER-COM-AUTH
ATTITUDE DH
HEADIN
HEADOUT
SCAN
UTILIZE
FLC
ATC
EQP
FSS
CHART
PUB
PF
PNF
SO
DMAN
SUPVR
CTLR
FLTSTRIP
NAVAID
STAGE3
Problematic Human Performances
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Decision after Treatment (cont'd) Action
DECIDE-N EQP-USE
DEP PROGRAM
TKOF SW ITCH
ABORT TBLSHOOT
RTN SETUP
AVD-W X HANDLE
GAR MODE-SEL
DIVERT TECHNIQ
COMPLY NAV
DEVIATE INSTRUM
TIMING DEADRECK
EMER PILOTAGE
LNDG TECHNIQ
MAP CHK-PT
CROSS MANIP
HLD-SHT TKOF
MTN CRS
CLIMB APCH 
DSCNT LNDG
TURN TAXI
AIRHLD PATTERN
TKOF-POS IMC
EXER-COM-AUTH CROSS-W IND
DH TECHNIQ
MANAGE OTHER
PRIORITIZE DEICING
ASSIGN
DELEGATE
DISCARD
RQST-INPUT
RSPND-INPUT
EVALUATE
INITIATE
MONITOR
FAIL-INTERV
TERMINATE
EARLY
LATE
DEV-SOP
INFLEX
INDECISION
UNLOAD
RECOGNIZE
Problematic Human Performances (cont'd)
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Message Origin Type
PSN DATA
FLC ALT
ATC HZPOS
GNDCREW SPEED
CAB ATT
FSS AIRSPACE
EQP REGS
ACFT TERRAIN
ATC W X
SCOPE ARPT
TAPE ROUTE
CHART PROC
SECTIONAL BRAKING
W AC FLT-PLAN
PLATES STORED
IFR-ENRTE HYDRAULICS
PUB FUEL
ATC-HD-BOOK ACS-STATUS
AIM ELECTRICAL
FARS PRESSURIZATN
FOM W T-BAL
MEL ADVSY
NOTAM CALLOUT
BULLETIN POINTOUT
LOA TFC
DIRECTIVE W X
OTH AIRMET
NOTES SIGMET
FLT-PROG-STRIP PIREP
DISPATCH CHKLIST
LOG CHALLENGE
Destination RESPONSE
PSN SQUAW K
FLC 1200
ATC 7500
GNDCREW 7600
CAB 7700
FSS INSTRUC
OTH CLRNC
Media AMENDED
DIR CANCELLED
VIS EXPEDITE
AUD TAPED
GESTURE ATIS
GND-EQP TW EBS
TPHONE FEED-BK
IPHONE CONFIRM
INTER READBACK
INTRA ACKNOW
COMPUTER QUERY
RDO RQST
CTAF PERMSN
UNICOM PROC
W RITTEN FREQ-CHG
LOG LOST-COM
Information Problems
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Type (cont'd) Problems (cont'd)
COORD EQP
HDOFF GND 
BRIEFG AIR
MANUAL OTS
INTENT W EAK
OTH INTERMITTENT
IN-BLIND ENVIRON
ABBRV FREQ-BLOCK
RELAY SIMUL-XMISSN
Reference Phase RANGE
GND STEEPED-ON
DEP NOISY
CRS AUD-INTERF
ARR VIS-INTERF
MNV FREQ-CONGEST
OTH FREQ-LAP
Problems RECEPTN
CONTENT W RNG-FREQ
FALSE NOT-OBS
INCOMPL NOT-MON
AMBIG NOT-HEARD
MISLEAD MISSED
IMPRUD INADEQUATE-DISSEM
CONFUS INTERP
TIMING MIS-INTERP
NEVER MINDSET
EARLY CALLSIGN
LATE NAME
OTH-PRIORITY NUMBER
XPRESSN LANGUAGE-BARRIER
SIM-SND RESPONSE
SIM-LOOK DENIED
PHRASEOLOGY REFUSED
TRANPOS NON-COMPLY
MISSTATE UTILIZN
CALLSIGN FORGOT
NAME DEGRADED
NUMBER OTH
VOX-QUAL GARBLED
ENNUNC INTERMITTENT
CLUTTER LOST-COM
W RNG-FREQ
SPCH-RATE
LANGUAGE-BARRIER
Information Problems (cont'd)
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Clrnc Coord
Imprud Untimely
Misdirected Imprud
Misstated Misstated
LTSS Permitted Misdirected
Uncoord Non
Sector Penetration Briefing or Relief
Rwy Movement Flt Prog Strip
Advsy Not Posted
Safety Not Sent Late Posting
Tfc Not Sent Not Marked
W x Not Sent Improper Mrkng
Not Scanned
Nonstandard Phraseology
Flt Plan Handling
ATC-HANDLING
 
 
Misrepresentation
Ext.Environment Mod
Flight Mechanics Mod
Load./Spec. Eqpt Mod
MELMod
3D Trajectory Mod
Risk Mod
Structure Mod
Press/AirCond Sys Mod
Flight Auto Sys Mod
FMS Mod
Communicat. Sys Mod
Electrical Sys Mod
Auxiliary Eqpt Sys Mod
Flight Controls Sys Mod
Fuel Sys Mod
Hydraulic Sys Mod
Rain/Ice Sys Mod
Landing Gear Sys Mod
Navigation Sys Mod
Oxygen Sys Mod
Aux. Power Sys Mod
Powerplant Sys Mod
 
Organization
Responsibility
Carrying Out
Means
Drills
Design
Basic Design
Mechanical Ergonomy
Mental Ergonomy
Education
Basic Education
Specific Education
Documentation
Physical Faults
W rong Content
Requirements
Operational System Fault
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Independent Detector Resolutory Action (cont'd)
Cockpit Flight Crew
Flight Crew Avoid-Evas Action
Aircraft Equipment Exec. GAR or Missed Apch
Altitude Alert Regained Acft Control
TCAS Overcame Equip Problem
GPW S Aborted Tkof
Lite Became Reoriented
Vox Ret. Original Clrnc/Course
Sound Exec. Lost Com Procedure
ATC Declared Emergency
Controller Perf. Expedited Maneuver
ATC Equipment PNF Interv/Seized Controls
MSAW PNF Interv/Other
Conflict Alert Exerc. of Command Autho.
OEDP Prepared for Ditching
Resolutory Action Executed a 180
Controller Executed a 360
Intervened Dumped Fuel
Issued New Clearances Man. Out Penetrated Airsp
Declared Emergency Man. Out Adverse Env
Ordered Expedited Man. Abandoned Apch
Gave DF Steer Returned to Land
Activated Crash Alert Diverted to Alternate
Separated Traffic Forced Landing
Provided Flight Assist Landed Off Arpt
Issued Advisory Ordered Evacuation
Issued Alert Precautionary Landing
Aircraft Evacuated (Aircraft)
Automation Overrode Flt Crew Landed as Precaution
Equip. Prob. Dissipated Diverted to Another Airport
None Taken Returned to Assigned Airspace
Unable Returned to Assigned Altitude
Anomaly Accepted Landed in Emergency Condition
Detected After-the-Fact Overrode Automation
Insufficient Time Fire Extinguished
Resolutory Event
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Other 
Accession Number
Coding Form
Coding Status
Multiple Report Flag
SGL
MUL
Analyst Graphic
Y
N
Source
NF
ANONOM
Reporter's ACN
Receipt Date
Reporter Graphics
Response to Reporter
Analyst Callback
Completed
Attempted
None
Record Control
 
Air Traffic Incident
NMAC
Operational Error
Operational Deviation
Other ATC Handling
Pilot Deviation
Military Facility Deviation
Intra Facility Coordination Failure
Inter Facility Coordination Failure
Declared Emergency
FLT-ASSIST
SPILL-IN
SPILL-OUT
Air Traffic Incident
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Type of Event Problem Areas
Unique Event Performances
Recurrent Event Flight Crew Human Performance
Unwanted Situation ATC Human Performance
Special Handling Cabin Crew Human Performance
ROU Maintenance Human Performance
ABR Passenger Human Performance
OHN Procedures-Policies
FYI ATC
TEL ARPT
RCC ACR
MMW MIL
Primary Problem Company
ATC Human Performance FAA
Cabin Crew Human Performance Documentation
Flight Crew Human Performance Chart
Passenger Human Parformance Publication
Aircraft  Regulation
ATC Facility Design
Airport Airspace Structure
Navigational Facility Aircraft
Airspace Structure Airport
Company Equipment
FAA ATC
Chart or Publication NAVAID
Environmental Factor Aircraft
W eather Environmental Factors
Ambiguous W eather
Special Educational Value IFE
Y Preoccupation
N Div
Traffic
Ranked Severity Conflict
Number (0 to 10) Preoccupation
General Assesments
ersion
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GEN-SIT FAA-POL
Acft Type or Class See and Avoid
Aircraft Design Fac Staffing
Equipment Keep 'em High
Airframe Enforcement
Engine Flow Control
Chart Noise Abatement
Publication Non Radar Proc
An Intxn Name/Other Name Criteria
Design W x Observ
Airspace Separation
Route Certification
Physical Facility FLC
ATC Ctlr
Arpt Equipment
NAVAID Oth Psn
TFC Performance Mix Info Dissemination
Procedure or Policy Charted Procedure
ATC Fac Arr
Arpt Dep
Company Other
FAA Twr-Enroute Ctlr
NAVAID Equipment
FAR Transponder
CPNY-POL Oth
Alt Callout Training
Alt Rptg FLC
Crew Scheduling Oth
Mntc Scheduling Air Carrier Inspection
Push-Bk Sterile Ckpt
Pwr-Bk Emergency
Deicing
Loading Procedure
Info Dissemination
Emergency
Schedule Adherence
Fuel Conservation
Situation
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Interpersonal Coord. within and between Facilities
Intra-Ckpt IntraFac
Inter-Ckpt Twr
Intra-Fac TRACON
Inter-Fac ARTCC
Supvr-Ctrl FSS
Ctrl-Oth MilFac
FLC-ATC InterFac
FLC-CAB Twr-Twr
FLC-GND Twr-TRACON
FLC-DISP Twr-ARTCC
FLC-FSS Twr-FSS
FLC-CENR Twr-MilFac
FLC-CHKPLT TRACON-TRACON
FLC-Oth TRACON-ARTCC
Oth-Oth TRACON-FSS
Labor Relations TRACON-MilFac
ARTCC-ARTCC
ARTCC-FSS
ARTCC-MilFac
FSS-FSS
FSS-MilFac
MilFac-MilFac
Adverse Interactions
 
 
FAA/ATC
Investigated
Assigned or Threatened Penalties
Reviewed Incident with Flt Crew
Other
Physical Injury
Emotional Trauma
Acft Damaged
Tail Skid
W ing Tip
Undercarriage
Propeller
Tires
Fire
Company Review
Flight Canceled
Stranded
Maintenance Action
Violation Not Pursued
Consequence
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APPENDIX E: SITUATION AWARENESS 
 
 
E-1. Introduction 
 
In this report, we are concerned with failures of Situation Awareness, and it is important that this be 
differentiated from a similar term that is often used in related literature, Situation Assessment. 
Situation Assessment is used in contexts that are slow, deliberate, strategic, and search-oriented. 
Situation Awareness is used in the context of events, processes, and interactions that are fast, event-
driven, and tactical or reactive. 
 
Situation Assessment would be an appropriate term to use, for example, if a management team were 
considering a large, long-term investment in a foreign country, perhaps the construction of new 
manufacturing facilities. They would be well advised to gather data and to carry out systematic 
statistical projections related to such topics as employment patterns, vocational performance, 
education, technology development, drug abuse, disease, and security. They might even have an 
opportunity to employ sophisticated data-fusion methods and other problem-solving techniques to 
place their decisions and actions on a rational footing. 
 
Situation Awareness (SA) is concerned with a completely different set of issues: the operational 
state of an expert human performer in a dynamic and potentially dangerous environment. In this 
report, we are considering pilots and air-traffic controllers operating in the global civil aviation 
environment. Other studies of SA have focused on challenging military operations, such as 
command and control in joint-operations combat. Still others have studied automobile drivers, 
anesthesiologists, space mission ground-controllers, and firefighters. 
 
In Section 9 of this report, we proposed that Behavior in our definition of Scenario is always 
associated with loss of SA. To make progress on the analysis and measurement of Behavior, it is 
necessary to break SA down into more concrete and constructive components. Fortunately, we can 
draw on an extensive SA research literature. A number of previous studies have highlighted levels or 
stages of SA that are closely related to our list of discriminating components: Detection, 
Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction (DRICP). Furthermore, we can draw on 
the extensive research literature in related domains of human factors, expert performance, and 
behavioral decision theory. 
 
These components of SA can be further defined as follows: 
Detection is the act of discovering, discerning, or capturing attention as this is related to the 
existence, presence, or fact of an event. To be detected, event E must entail a change above 
threshold or a change from adaptation level, though E does not have to be assigned to a more 
abstract class or type. Balakrishnan (1998) provides a discussion of detection and the 
important related concept of vigilance. The vigilance-detection paradigm can be seen as the 
most elementary setting for Situation Awareness in which adequate performance is defined 
simply as noticing and responding to changes from baseline stimulation. (We note that 
simple does not mean easy—pure vigilance tasks are notoriously difficult and error-prone.) 
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Recognition is the act of relating a detected event E to a class or type of event that has been 
perceived before. Event E can be assigned to an event type when it is perceived as a 
recurrence of something experienced previously. Richman et al. (1996) discuss the central 
importance of recognition in expert performance. Expertise, in general, and expert-level 
Situation Awareness, in particular, depend on the acquisition of reliable and nearly automatic 
domain-specific skills of recognition.  
Interpretation is the act of relating a specific event type to a network of actual and possible 
events of various other types. Event E cannot only be assigned a class, but it can also be 
related to other classes of event types within a conceptual structure. Ericsson and Kintsch 
(1991) have described these kinds of conceptual structures as long-term working memory 
(LTWM) and have presented experimental evidence for the central role of LTWM in 
experts’ interpretation of domain-specific events. 
Comprehension is the act of perceiving the significance of an event. Event E not only can be 
assigned a place within a logical or categorical paradigm, but can also be understood in terms 
of its role in a familiar temporal pattern of events. The pattern may enable an expert to infer 
past events that must have caused E, or future events that must follow from E, or concurrent 
events that must accompany E.  
Prediction is the act of forecasting what will happen in the near future. Event E is understood 
as part of a predictable sequence, so that specific future events are expected based on the 
occurrence of E. In many domains, including aviation, experts typically stay “ahead of the 
curve” by actively predicting and preparing for plausible continuations.  
 
The aim of this Appendix is to provide pointers into the research literature on SA, and to explain 
briefly how our technical approach, described in Section 9, relates to previous work. We will also be 
as explicit as possible about the boundary conditions and limitations of our approach, 
acknowledging that our simplifications will have to be corrected through future research. 
 
E-2. Situation Awareness, Prediction, and Active Cognition 
 
Humans are limited in the amount and kinds of information they can process, and in the speed with 
which they can process it. Highly trained professionals—pilots, physicians, firefighters—can get 
into situations in which the apparent information-processing requirements exceed human abilities. 
Yet experts usually perform reliably in these kinds of environments. How is this possible? 
 
The lowest level of SA involves detecting and recognizing low-level attributes and dynamics of 
objects and events. The second level involves interpreting and comprehending the situation based on 
knowledge of significant, but more abstract, relations among the recognized elements. This level of 
interpretation and comprehension relates concrete objects and events to operational goals in ways 
that go beyond the data that are concretely available. The third level of prediction requires the ability 
to project the near-term course of events into the future. This highest level achieves closed-loop 
behavior via continuous perception of situation elements in relation to goals, threats, resources, 
actions, and consequences.  
 
The key factor in many types of expert performance seems to be what Jones and Endsley (1996) 
have called "Level 3 SA," that is, prediction or mental projection, "a very demanding task, which 
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people generally perform poorly" (p. 508). Expert knowledge can be defined, in large part, as a set 
of pre-compiled memory structures and specialized cognitive retrieval processes that, together, 
implement predictions of likely event-sequences, including adaptive responses. There is no mystery 
to the pre-compilation process: it is simply the outcome of many years of formal training and 
professional experience (Ericsson 1996, pp.10–11; Richman et al. 1996, pp. 172ff). 
 
Prediction is the acid test of a scientific theory and is one of the major goals of applied science. 
Elaborate causal models and statistical methods are used to try to predict earthquakes, storms, 
climate change, and the time-course of epidemics. Prediction is also at the core of active learning 
strategies that are advocated by instructors to improve students’ skills in reading, listening, 
mathematics, and test-taking. The ability to predict has obvious practical value in avoiding or 
mitigating the effects of unfavorable events, but it is also instrumental in effective cognitive 
performance. An orientation toward active prediction is the hallmark of cognitive engagement in an 
on-going task. Thus, prediction is a key component of all kinds of individual and collective 
expertise, and is perhaps the most important theoretical link between research on SA and research on 
learning and expertise. 
 
E-3. Situation Awareness Research 
 
Jeannot (2000) (see also van Gool et al. 2002) summarizes the Human Factors research on SA, 
emphasizing cognitive aspects such as mental models, long term memory, working memory, 
workload, and human-automation interaction, with special emphasis on the nature of SA in air traffic 
control (cf. Gronlund et al. 1998). He states: 
“In many, if not all, of the controller cognitive models, maintaining Situation Awareness is 
the core sub-process, the basic background activity to air traffic control. The importance of 
“background activity” is recognized as critical by (controllers) themselves. They refer to this 
phenomenon as “having the picture.” For controllers, “having the picture” is the first pre-
requisite to handling their traffic.... “Losing the picture” is reported as one of the biggest 
risks for controllers, as it is the source of several risks: The controller 
• is no longer able to predict the evolution of the situation,  
• fails to detect early enough a problem or a conflict,  
• does not choose the optimum resolution, 
• and, in extreme cases, allows the creation of incidents or accidents.” 
 
Domain-specific representations help to maintain SA via “cognitive economy” (Endsley 2000a). 
Only when information on position and altitude are insufficient for conflict detection will controllers 
look for other sources of information, and then they operate in predictive mode, anticipating the 
situation and working ahead. The more experienced the controller, the more selective his or her 
mental model becomes, even to the point of being “inaccurate” or “distorted”—but in ways that 
promote effective performance (Gronlund et al. 1998). Less experienced controllers have more 
concrete details available about traffic. They tend to “focus on every aircraft,” whereas experts 
classify aircraft into two groups: “those requiring further analysis and those which can be separated 
safely immediately.” 
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Patel et al. (1996, pp. 130ff.) provide an instructive discussion of active information-seeking in the 
context of medical expertise. They describe four stages of information processing called 
observations, findings, facets, and diagnosis. Observations are raw data at our detection/recognition 
(D/R) level. Findings are interpretations (I) of data, and facets are clusters of related findings. 
Diagnosis corresponds to our comprehension (C) level and constitutes the basis for predicting (P) the 
future (prognosis). Facets play an active role in organizing multiple competing interpretations, 
directing the search for additional data (findings) to resolve pending issues, and providing the 
building blocks for a satisfactory diagnosis. In-depth exploration of expert performance shows that 
even the cyclical model is an over-simplification (cf. Frederiksen and White 1990). The more highly 
skilled the expert performer, the more flexibly he or she moves among different knowledge 
representations and different levels of processing. 
 
Different levels of proactive engagement in the dynamic control task characterize different levels of 
expertise. Cognitive engagement, prediction, and effective control are interrelated. This is one of the 
reasons why automation can sometimes undermine SA, producing 
• loss of vigilance 
• increase in complacency 
• change from active to passive processing 
• loss of or a change in the type of feedback.  
 
Automation can also become the object of SA itself, in that more experienced operators develop skill 
in predicting the future behavior of automated systems (Jodlowski et al. 2002). Operators’ SA 
regarding automated systems is in turn influenced both by training (Endsley and Robertson 2000) 
and by display design (Kelley 2002). Understanding automation can be defined, in part, as the 
avoidance of “automation surprises.” Avoiding surprise is the same as being able to predict what 
will happen next if a certain input is provided to the automation (Woods et al. 1994). This human-
automation interaction is further complicated by the fact that the automated system has its own SA 
of the state of its portion of the world. 
 
In addition to automation effects, the management of SA in aviation and other environments can be 
complicated by factors such as distributed roles and responsibilities, which create the need for 
shared SA (among multiple human and non-human agents), and by mobility of the agents who must 
maintain this shared SA. Artman and Garbis (1998) and Stroeve et al. (2003) show how an initially 
safe situation can evolve into an unsafe one via divergent SA among the operators of the system. 
Johnston et al. (1997) emphasize the need for process analysis in addition to outcome measurement 
(i.e., the why in addition to the what in the terminology of this report). Individual and team processes 
interact in determining overall SA. 
 
Taking an even broader perspective, Woods et al. (1994) (cf. Cook and Woods 1994) and Moray 
(1994) place SA in the context of human-systems analysis and research on human error as a systems 
problem. Cook and Woods point out the multifaceted nature of SA—control of attention, mental 
simulation, directed attention, contingency planning, mental bookkeeping. In general, any 
multitasking environment requires shifts of attention among different threads, and coordinating these 
shifts requires a coherent system-model or situation-model. 
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E-4. The Cyclic Nature of SA 
 
In our simplified model of Behavior, we use the DRICP framework of SA as though Detection, 
Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction occur in sequential order, each 
successive stage using the output of the preceding stage. However, as Carroll et al. (2001) document, 
citing Neisser (1976), human cognition is a cyclic process in which prediction facilitates 
comprehension and interpretation, and in which comprehensible and interpretable events are more 
easily detected and recognized than are unpredictable and incomprehensible events. In fact, Jones 
and Endsley (1996) point out that many Level 2 SA errors (for example, misinterpretation of 
landmarks) can be attributed to incorrect expectations (erroneous predictions), which then cause a 
persistent misrecognition and misinterpretation of perceptual data.  
 
Figure E-1 from Neisser (1976), which we borrow from Carroll et al. (2001), illustrates the more 
complex model of active information seeking. Experts’ skilled performance (Richman et al. 1996), 
as well as their characteristic susceptibility to certain kinds of errors (Cook and Woods 1994; Jones 
and Endsley 1996), can be best understood as a knowledge-driven, prediction-oriented cognitive 
process, not as a data-driven, passive, perceptual one.  
 
Knowledge
Environment
ExplorationDirects
Modifies Samples
 
Figure E-1. The perception-action cycle (Neisser 1976). 
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What Happened, and Why: Toward an Understanding of Human
Error Based on Automated Analyses of Incident Reports—Vol. I
Nicolas P. Maille1, Ph.D.; Thomas A. Ferryman2;
Loren J. Rosenthal3; Michael G. Shafto, Ph.D.4; and
Irving C. Statler, Ph.D.4
The objective of the Aviation System Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project of NASA’s Aviation Safety and Security Program was to develop technologies that will
enable proactive management of safety risk, which entails identifying the precursor events and conditions that foreshadow most accidents. This presents a particular challenge
in the aviation system where people are key components and human error is frequently cited as a major contributing factor or cause of incidents and accidents. In the aviation
“world”, information about what happened can be extracted from quantitative data sources, but the experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source
of information about why an incident happened. This report describes a conceptual model and an approach to automated analyses of textual data sources for the subjective
perspective of the reporter of the incident to aid in understanding why an incident occurred. It explores a first-generation process for routinely searching large databases of
textual reports of aviation incident or accidents, and reliably analyzing them for causal factors of human behavior (the why of an incident).
We have defined a generic structure of information that is postulated to be a sound basis for defining similarities between aviation incidents. Based on this structure, we have
introduced the simplifying structure, which we call the Scenario as a pragmatic guide for identifying similarities of what happened based on the objective parameters that
define the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario.
We believe that it will be possible to design an automated analysis process guided by the structure of the Scenario that will aid aviation-safety experts to understand the systemic
issues that are conducive to human error.
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